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TAKING JIHAD OUT OF THE HANDS OF INFIDELS

by

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June 2007

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TAKING JIHAD OUT OF THE HANDS OF INFIDELS

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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that the perceived justness of a call to jihad will resonate with the most dedicated and sincere audience and is a key component of the weaponization of the ideology. The response to this call generates ardent support in the form of individuals willing to kill or be killed in order to see the jihad succeed. In classical jihads, rulers were able to mobilize their nations for war when these conditions were met. Over time, the ideology of jihad has transformed in parallel with changes in the world system. Jihad rhetoric continues to be incorporated in the ideologies of non-state actors, who have arguably created ideological variants based on their own interpretations. This thesis seeks to explain how the Internet makes the jihad a potent global reality by negating the need for infidel alliances, personalizing the actions of its adherents and distributing the message and methods of jihad to an indeterminate number of actors.

This thesis recommends that continual pressure in the form of infiltration or cooptation of these sites forces those who promote violent jihad ideologies to increase their cyber security measures — essentially raising the cost in terms of time if not money. While these groups have evidenced a tremendous capacity for organizational learning and have significant resources, these resources are not endless. Part of a successful counter ideological strategy needs to involve consistently applying pressure through the medium of the Internet in order to raise the stakes of the game and alter the radicalization process.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Even a cursory look at today's headlines provides a reminder of the religious themes that are inextricably associated with turmoil in the Middle East. The subject of numerous books and essays, the word *jihad* has taken on its own identity in the modern world. Not only does the word *jihad* appear in academic and popular literature, but it has also made its way into the Army and Marine Corps's Joint Publication on Counterinsurgency¹ and even the National Security Strategy of the United States.² Historically, the Islamic political leaders used language of jihad to mobilize forces to counter heresy, defend Islamic lands from other nations and to expand the sphere of Islam.³ Today, the vitriolic rhetoric of a universal global jihad is manifested in cyberspace. The Internet provides an ideological foundation that challenges individuals to take the initiative and prove their faithfulness at times and places of their choosing.

This thesis argues that the perceived justness of a call to jihad will resonate with the most dedicated and sincere audience and is a key component of the weaponization of the ideology. The response to this call generates ardent support in the form of individuals willing to kill or be killed in order to see the jihad succeed. In classical jihads, rulers were able to mobilize their nations for war when these conditions were met.

This thesis will look at cases where jihad was triggered in response to a known threat that required an Islamic state to preemptively strike on behalf of the Islamic community. It will also look at other cases where offensive actions were politically motivated and not given the blessing of religious authority and were, in effect, secular wars that did not warrant the religiously loaded title of jihad. Jihad ideology transformed

¹ George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf>, accessed January 25, 2007, 26.

² The National Security Strategy of the United States, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>, accessed January 25, 2007, 14.

³ Reuven Firestone, *Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, 69.

concurrently with changes in the world system. Jihad rhetoric continues to be incorporated in the ideologies of non-state actors who have arguably created ideological variants based on their own interpretations.

This thesis will compare the jihad ideology used to mobilize forces for the jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan with those of the global jihad taking place today. In both instances, a call went out to the worldwide Muslim community, or *ummah*; in response, a broad swathe of recruits from that worldwide community answered the call. Another reason for comparing these cases is that while the language of jihad is not used solely by Sunni-based groups, the majority of Islamic organizations who waged jihad against the Soviet Union⁴ and those who claim to be waging today's global jihad are closely linked with Sunni groups. Indeed, many of the actors involved are still the same.⁵ Reviewing cases that have a similar universal call and a similar religious base will yield important insights on how the jihad has transformed in the age of globalization.

The use of jihad rhetoric to attempt to rally a nation to arms was exemplified by Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom and by the Afghan mujahadeen during the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.⁶ These examples indicate that, at some level, politics and war are still viewed by some as the arena for the clash of religious ideologies as much as they are of political ideologies, access to resources and the like. The historical record also shows that the jihad is not only a rallying cry used by caliphs, sultans and presidents to rally their people against their enemies. While political leaders have invoked religious rhetoric to galvanize their nations for war, it is non-state actors, such as the Kharijites of early Islam and groups such as Al Qaeda today, who have the most notorious reputation for their fanatical merging of jihad ideology and warfare.

In the past, Islamic empires or states waged wars under the banner of jihad. In several instances these classical jihads were fought alongside or with the support of non-

⁴ Kepel, 137.

⁵ Devji, 51.

⁶ Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2002, 136-150.

Islamic “infidel” allies against mutual foes.⁷ While there is precedence for the legitimacy of these alliances within Islamic tradition, the notion of fighting alongside infidels is anathema to those with a fundamentalist viewpoint.⁸ Those who claim to fight for the cause of jihad and tout religious purity believe they need to remain detached or appear to remain detached from the influence of infidels to maintain the legitimacy of their cause. Yet even extremist groups have found truth in the Napoleonic maxim that an army marches on its belly and have at times been driven to seek support from those who do not share their ideology in order to acquire the tools necessary for making war. How are these organizations able to reconcile their fundamentalist principles with the necessity for drawing support from a non-Islamic ally? And finally, has jihad ideology been made inherently more effective in the age of globalization?

In the religion of Islam, when a new believer first grasps the Qur’an, he does not instantaneously become a jihadi warrior brandishing an assault rifle or a suicide vest.⁹ Similarly, uranium in its natural state does not simply explode when it mixes with oxygen, is set on fire or if it is dropped from a great height. Likewise, the anthrax virus in its natural state does not arbitrarily threaten human life, but must be manufactured into an aerosol or powder form that can be dispersed over an area in order for its killing power to be unleashed as a weapon of mass destruction. This process, popularly referred to as *weaponization*, must first take place in order to harness uranium’s explosive properties or anthrax’s poisonous lethality for use as a killing machine. While jihad ideology may have a latent potency and a narrative of violence, actual physical violence is not initiated by a simple reading of the Qur’an or listening to the ravings of a fanatical cleric. The

⁷ Firestone, 67.

⁸ Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955, 62.

⁹ The impact of Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*, Marx’s *Communist Manifesto*, or Mao’s *Little Red Book* were obviously deeply tied to other cultural and political phenomenon taking place at the time of their writing. While these books were influential, they were perhaps neither necessary nor sufficient for turning an individual into a National Socialist, Communist or Maoist. The author, who has spent a great deal of time reading various elements of jihad ideology, submits himself as a case study to demonstrate the insufficiency of the literature, by itself, to radicalize an individual.

process of weaponization, or mobilization, for the jihad has taken place at different periods of time and under various circumstances is crucial to understanding violence carried out under the banner of jihad.

The literature on the Islamic views of warfare divides into two main viewpoints. From one point of view, Islam is seen as a religion whose very nature is rooted in warfare, furthered by warfare and maintained by warfare. These authors argue that Islam is by nature a religion of the offense which requires its followers to spread the faith with the sword. The secondary viewpoint, which makes up the larger group of writers, describes Islam as a religion whose main goal is establishing order in society and defending Muslims from oppression.

Some authors describe warfare in the name of jihad as an embedded requirement on the Muslim community for Islam to achieve the goal of subjugating all men to the will of Allah according to the Islamic scriptures. The idea that the world is divided into two separate spheres, “the House of Islam (dar al-Islam) where Muslims rule...and the House of War (dar al-Harb)”¹⁰ is emphasized as proof that Islamic writings accentuate an irreconcilable polarity in the world between those who practice Islam and those who do not. Essentially, “the dar al-Islam was always and will always, in theory, be at war with the dar al-Harb.”¹¹ According to this viewpoint then, until Islam prevails universally, Muslims will be in a continual state of war until all are brought under the rule of the House of Islam. That Muslims have a natural affinity for warfare is not only attributed to Islamic writings, but also stems from the “warlike character of the Arabian tribes,”¹² which describes the chaotic nature of the culture prior to the arrival of Islam. The complicated relationship between Islam and warfare can be seen in the life of the prophet Muhammad who, “(i)n spite, however, of his advocacy of violence...appears to have been by nature of a kind and even an affectionate temperament.”¹³ From this

¹⁰ Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, 73.

¹¹ Khadduri, 51.

¹² John Bagot Glubb, *The Empire of the Arabs*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963, 22.

¹³ Glubb, 22.

perspective, to understand the “Roots of Muslim Rage,”¹⁴ one generally needs to look no further than the foundations of the religion itself.

The larger group of writers on this subject seeks to demonstrate the multifaceted nature of Islam as a religion which provides guidance on how Muslims should conduct themselves during both war and peace. While jihad may include “struggle for the defense of Islam...jihad is not supposed to include aggressive warfare.”¹⁵ The desired end state sought after in Islam is harmony with others and in “the conscience of the great majority of contemporary Muslims...implacable warfare in the name of *jihad* is not the sole or the best measure of Islamic loyalty.”¹⁶ Wars had existed for several centuries before Islam and early Islamic thinkers viewed wars as “forms of social sickness...which violated the divine laws and should be condemned.”¹⁷ Many of these early Islamic thinkers viewed Islam as the vehicle by which the sickness of war would be healed.

The idea that Islam is a religion of aggression is challenged by Farooq Hassan who states that: “in reality an offensive picture of Jihad had been painted by Islam’s enemies.”¹⁸ Hilmi Zawati likewise claims that “Peace is the rule and war is the exception in the doctrine of jihad” and that “*Jihad* is the *bellum justum* (Just War) of Islam.”¹⁹ As the world system transformed, “jihad underwent certain changes” and as Majid Khadduri wrote in 1953, the jihad had “become an obsolete weapon.”²⁰ This argument

¹⁴ Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” *Policy*, volume 17, issue 4, 2001.

¹⁵ John L. Esposito, *Islam the Straight Path*, revised third edition, New York, Oxford University Press, 2005, 93.

¹⁶ Bruce Lawrence, editor, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*. London: Verso, 2005, xxi.

¹⁷ Noor Mohammad, 384.

¹⁸ Farooq Hassan, *The Concept of State and Law in Islam* (Washington: University Press of America, 1981), 208.

¹⁹ Hilmi Zawati, *Is Jihad a Just War? War, Peace and Human Rights under Islamic and Public International Law*, Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2002, 111-112.

²⁰ Khadduri, 51

notwithstanding, the language and ideology of jihad perseveres and, instead of a “trail of decline,”²¹ there appears to be a broader, more distributed and perhaps more idealistic strain of jihad ideology.

These authors recognize that, at times, the actions of groups and nations claiming to act on behalf of the jihad have been preemptively aggressive and unnecessarily violent. Deviations from the intended purpose of jihad should be critically analyzed to demonstrate how the language of jihad can be misunderstood or purposefully taken out of context and manipulated for the purpose of activating violence. From this set of authors several theories have been developed to attempt to explain about how and why jihad ideology has frequently been co-opted and paired with national, cultural or universal causes to generate individual or collective violence.

Although Khadduri indicated that the utilization of jihad rhetoric in mobilizing nations for war was becoming obsolete for states in the modern world system, the language of jihad still appears in the present world. This thesis will look at case studies to evaluate how the ideology of jihad has been adapted and refined over time with particular attention to its salience in the age of globalization. To evaluate the cases requires theoretical lenses that have been developed to analyze the connection between ideology and action.

Social Mobilization Theory (SMT) looks at how individuals are drawn into groups who see a need to make a change in the status quo. Three of the key causal variables analyzed under SMT are: “changes in political opportunity structures,” “mobilizing structures”, and “cultural framing.”²² SMT analyzes the hierarchy of these groups and the causes which they rally for and against and looks at the rational, strategic and calculated responses being made by these groups in order to meet the goals of their organizations. These theories also analyze the trajectories of how groups, their ideologies and their techniques adapt over time in response to various conditions.

²¹ Kepel, 376.

²² Glenn E. Robinson, “HAMAS as a Social Movement,” *Islamic Activism, A Social Movement Theory Approach*, edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004, 116.

According to Christian Smith, the importance of religion in political action needed to be brought back in to the debate on collective action; academics had discounted its importance for decades, essentially excommunicating it from the social sciences. Whereas the social sciences had denigrated the importance of religion as the irrational musings of the masses or the tool of elites used to keep the masses in line, SMT recognized that religion can be a rational, calculating force used to “turn the world upside-down.”²³ Religions serve two important functions for mobilization: to define what is “right, just, fair,” and to show how a given situation is “needlessly unjust.”²⁴ The variance between reality and the ideal is where a group sees the need to mobilize in an attempt to correct the current situation.

SMT attempts to explain how and why groups choose to partner with religious movements in order to effect change in the status quo, oftentimes becoming “the very substance of these social movements’ grievances, identities, organizations and strategies.”²⁵ SMT does not overemphasize the influence of religion as a monocausal factor in explaining social movements but rather shows that it can be part of a “cultural toolbox” which may be used by social mobilization organizations for framing issues to arouse consciousness and ultimately goad people into action.

Religious organizations offer tangible and intangible resources that have been, to varying degrees, a part of numerous historic social movements. Religion can be a natural ideological ally of social movements by helping to bring legitimacy a cause, thereby adding an intangible spiritual dimension such as a moral imperative to a movement. Such an imperative obligates members of that religion to participate in the movement, if they are to prove their faithfulness and sincerity. Religious organizations such as churches and mosques also provide practical resources. These include established networks of followers, meeting locations, religious symbolism and institutional

²³ Christian Smith, “Correcting a Curious Neglect, or Bringing Religion Back In,” *Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social-Movement Activism*, edited by Christian Smith, New York: Routledge, 1996, 1.

²⁴ Ibid., 10.

²⁵ Ibid., 9.

protection, which a social movement can incorporate into a movement strategy.²⁶ While religion has at times been marginalized by societies, it can also be a rallying point in times of duress. Learning to interpret the conditions in which social mobilizations merge with religion, or religious groups mobilize to accomplish a political purpose, is crucial.²⁷

This thesis seeks to explain how the Internet makes the jihad a potent global reality by negating the need for infidel alliances, personalizing the actions of its adherents, and distributing the message and methods of jihad to an indeterminate number of actors. The cases will show that the global jihad has taken lessons — on how to use jihad ideology to mobilize forces — from a universal audience for the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan to a universal audience that targets America and “the West.” It has juxtaposed this ideology with the tools of globalization, enabling the jihad to maintain its ideological purity as it has become more operationally flexible.

²⁶ Smith, 9-17.

²⁷ Ibid., 8-9.

II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF JIHAD

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines the foundations of jihad ideologies within Islam. It begins, first, by describing the conditions under which caliphs or other leader of the Islamic community called for jihad, to spread the faith or defend the community, which are its traditional functions. It then compares this classical form of jihad with the advent of leaders calling for a global jihad of dissent from outside the trained clerisy or Islamic polity, such as Osama bin Laden. It provides a foundation for the argument that this latter form of jihad would not be possible without modern tools of communication, especially the Internet.

Islamic writings provide a narrative and scriptural foundation for jihad ideologies that may be used to not only satiate the requirements to wage a just cause, but also to energize followers to fight for that cause. Empires, countries and non-state actors whose religious roots are traced to Islam have found guidance pertaining to the conduct of jihad in the pages of the Qur'an, the record of the life of the Prophet Muhammad, called the *hadith*, the rulings of Islamic clergy, and the philosophies of Muslim scholars and jurists. The ideology of jihad was not developed in an enclosed religious vacuum, however, and was as much a product of its environment as it was of the doctrines and practices of the Islamic faith. In reviewing the meaning of jihad, these sources are crucial for understanding the motivation and criteria for military action taken by "self-proclaimed Islamic regimes"²⁸ as well as those non-state groups claiming to act under the banner of jihad.

In declaring a jihad, certain criteria theoretically needs to be met to validate in the minds of those engaging in the jihad that they are in fact serving on the good or just side of a conflict. This is because "Islam outlawed all forms of war except the jihad, that is,

²⁸ Ibrahim A. Karawan, "Monarchs, Mullas, and Marshals: Islamic Regimes?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, (November 1992) Volume 524, 107.

the war in Allah's path."²⁹ . These stipulations include criteria pertaining to the target of the jihad, the legitimacy of the authority of those calling for the jihad and the audience being rallied for the jihad. When an Islamic nation is, "resorting to war,"³⁰ adhering to these criteria or principles is therefore necessary for maintaining an aura of justness for the jihad within the minds of the participants.

B. PRE-ISLAMIC INFLUENCES

The actions of the first Muslims in the early stages of the rise of Islam were arguably impacted by historical and cultural legacies that carried over from their pre-Islamic education and upbringing. For instance, at the time of the writing of the Qur'an, the belief that the end of the world was coming at any moment was prevalent in the thinking of many of the Arabic tribes prior to the arrival of Islam. These forebodings were perhaps influenced by Christian, Zoroastrian and Jewish writings on that subject. This apocalyptic influence may help explain why the early focus on warfare was viewed as a desperate struggle by the forces of good against the forces of evil as the final days of the world approached.³¹ In order to more accurately review the ideology of jihad, the foundation of the religion needs to be understood in light of these pre-Islamic influences. It is important to understand that the environment of warfare associated with the beginning of jihad, show that it is not simply a manifestation of Islam.

The time period before Islam is referred to as a time of *jahiliyya*, or ignorance, specifically of Allah and his laws. Prior to the foundation of Islam, the Arabian Peninsula saw tremendous chaos, an absence of law and the devaluation of human life. For instance, female babies were frequently buried alive and men killed others simply to steal their resources. While raiding and warfare were ever present, there were some lessons taken from this time period that were amenable to Islam, such as the importance of honor, bravery and kinship in a community.³² These tribes also agreed to a "period of

²⁹ Khadduri, 62.

³⁰ Firestone, 15.

³¹ Johnson and John Kelsay, 43-46.

³² Firestone, 30-31.

nonbelligerency” during sacred months, a practice that would be carried over to Islam.³³ Although these examples point to a base level of civility existing in the culture before the arrival of Islam, the *jahiliyya* is viewed as the antithesis of true Islamic rule.

C. JIHAD IN THE QUR’AN

In discussing any issue related to Islam, the first source that should be considered is the Qur’an. The subject of jihad is addressed in several areas scattered throughout various *suras*, or chapters in the Qur’an. The word jihad, which means “to strive or struggle,”³⁴ is generally ascribed two distinct meanings within the Qur’an. First is the *greater jihad*, which describes an individual’s internal battle against his own flesh as well as personal efforts made to manifest God’s will on earth, also known as jihad of the heart. Subordinate to this is the *lesser jihad*, sometimes called military jihad, in which individuals may be called upon to take part in physical fighting or warfare on behalf of the faith or for the good of the community.³⁵ The Qur’an further elaborates on both aspects, describing a jihad of the tongue as efforts made to spread the faith through dialogue and reasoning, as opposed to the jihad of the sword, which involves more direct methods.

Instructions relating to the conduct of the jihad are spread throughout the Qur’an. Taken as a whole, the jihad verses give a broad, sometimes conflicting picture of what jihad is. To explain these variances, the process of abrogation was used to highlight which *suras*, or portions thereof, were nullified or expounded upon by later Qur’anic revelations. For instance, some *suras* apparently place restrictions on fighting, admonishing the community to:

Fight in the path of God those who fight you, but do not transgress limits,
for God does not love transgressors. (Sura 2:190)³⁶

³³ Firestone, 38-39.

³⁴ John L. Esposito, 93.

³⁵ Firestone, 17.

³⁶ Marmaduke Pickthall. *The Meaning of the Glorious Koran: An Explanatory Translation* by Marmaduke Pickthall. New York, Dorset Press, 50.

In contrast, the sura that immediately follows, if taken on its own, seems to encourage the community to fight in the way of jihad as a kind of continuing action: “Kill them wherever you find them” (Sura 2:191). Islamic scholars generally agree that these two suras, while co-located in the Qur’an, were not intended to be linked in a historical context but rather were placed together because they were dealing with a similar subject.³⁷ Debate has taken place over which limits Sura 2:190 is referring to and how it is abrogated by 2:191. If the limits referred to in Sura 2:190 are geographical limits, are these then abrogated by Sura 2:191? If so, then it could be deduced that the sura implies that there are no longer restrictions as to where and when transgressors may be killed. The limits could also be referring to the killing of noncombatants with 2:191 raising the ban to allow such action. While Islamic scholars and others continue to debate the meanings, context and abrogation of texts such as these examples, other individuals have taken it upon themselves to develop their own interpretations and actions in response to their version of what the texts mean, regardless of the ongoing debates.

The debates, around which suras hold their ground while others are considered to be abrogated, are important — not just for grammatical or theological accuracy. These passages are the cornerstone for understanding how the jihad may be transformed into physical warfare. While the majority of scholarly work on Islam may take these Qur’anic verses in their entirety with a view to understanding their context and interpretation, it is also apparent that the suras pertaining to jihad are ripe for manipulation by those who use “selective quotes from the Quran to support their positions,”³⁸ and justify their actions in a religious shroud.

³⁷ Firestone, 54-55.

³⁸ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, 17.

D. JIHAD IN THE SUNNA

In addition to the Qur'an, another source of Islamic legal foundations is the Sunna, which "includes what the Prophet said, what he did, and those actions that he permitted or allowed."³⁹ These include several *hadiths*, or "remembered stories about what the Prophet said and did,"⁴⁰ that describe Muhammad's views on the jihad. These contributions are important for they describe in great detail how Muhammad actually lived his life and how he handled himself in various situations, including warfare. Some major issues with the hadiths arise from the numerous word-of-mouth testaments circulating which were attributed to Muhammad by various sources several years after his death and the problems inherent with verifying the validity of these sources. As some aspects of these oral traditions may have been lost in translation and others may have even been blatant forgeries, the hadith is rightfully viewed with some skepticism. In general, however, the hadiths that were accepted by the majority of Islamic scholars were in keeping with the society and worldview of the times.⁴¹

The hadith records a great number of traditions that expound the virtues of participating in the jihad, specifically the militarized variant. Included are the blessings promised for those who are killed while taking part in jihad, including direct entry into paradise as well as distributed intercessory blessings for the families of the fallen. In another instance, Muhammad is credited with stating that he wished he could be killed only to be reincarnated several times over so that he could meet the same fate each time — death in the way of jihad.⁴²

Involvement in the jihad was considered so important to some that they viewed it as the sixth pillar of Islam⁴³ and, according to their viewpoint, compulsory for the entire

³⁹ Esposito, *Islam the Straight Path*, 80.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 12.

⁴¹ Firestone, 94-96.

⁴² Ibid., 100.

⁴³ There are five generally accepted pillars of Islamic practice: (1) The Profession of Faith or *shahada*, (2) Prayer, (3) Almsgiving, or *zakat*, (4) The Fast of Ramadan and (5) Pilgrimage to Mecca, or *Hajj*. From Esposito, *Islam the Straight Path*, 88-93.

Muslim community. Part of the hadith tradition holds that the jihad is the zenith of dedication to Islam above all other requirements. This viewpoint is attributable to a response recorded in a hadith in which Muhammad is recorded as having said that there was no act comparable to jihad.⁴⁴

In addition to providing the impetus for participating in jihad, the hadith also posits the requirement that jihad may only be waged on specific terms. The hadith is quite specific that those who participate in jihad must be fighting “in the path of God” and not for personal glory, wealth or otherwise. This is because “Islam outlawed all forms of war except the jihad, that is, the war in Allah’s path.”⁴⁵ In all, the hadith gives a much clearer picture than the Qur’an of the necessity, guidelines and subsequent benefits associated with participating in the jihad.⁴⁶

E. JIHAD IN ISLAMIC TRADITION AND LITERATURE

Aside from the Qur’an and the hadith, other sources from the Islamic world are also considered part of the body of knowledge on the subject of jihad. Within the volumes of Islamic literature, several authors are specifically mentioned as crucial influencers of the Islamic juridical tradition in the arena of warfare: Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Tamiyya, Muhammad Ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani, al-Awza’i and Muhammad b. Jarir al-Tabari. According to Ibn Tamiyya, the criteria for engaging in warfare includes: “to defend Muslims against real or anticipated attacks; to guarantee and extend freedom of belief; and to defend the mission (*al-da’wah*) of Islam.”⁴⁷ Warfare was primarily for the purpose of “securing peace, justice and equity.”⁴⁸ These writers are developing a doctrine of jihad that describes a change in outlook from the early days of Islam, the Meccan period, to the days when Islam began to expand exponentially, referred to as the Medinan period.

⁴⁴ Firestone, 100.

⁴⁵ Khadduri, 62.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 100-102.

⁴⁷ Hilmi Zawati, 12.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 12.

Concurrent with the growth of Islam was a transformation of jihad ideology as understood by the experts at the time:

Qur'anic references to jihad by Muhammad that render the expansionist fight against unbelievers obligatory under any circumstances are said to take precedence over earlier (Meccan period) references to *jihad* against non-Muslims by means of preaching and persuasion.⁴⁹

This example lends some credence to the evolutionary theory of jihad. According to this theory, a change in jihad ideology took place over time.⁵⁰ In the first days of Islam, a virtual ban on fighting existed — where jihad of the tongue, or reasoned arguments, were the preferred method of spreading the faith. Over time, however, the frequency of jihad of the sword gradually increased as the number of Muslims grew, and the power of the Islamic state expanded.

As the number of followers of Islam grew, their presence became a threat to the non-Muslim world, which responded by persecuting those who had adopted the new religion. In response, jihad ideology, it has been argued, apparently evolved to allow for defensive fighting on behalf of the community, as during the Meccan period described above. It was during this period that Islam was first blooded through combat at the Battle of Badr. Given the nature of the Qur'anic criteria, as well as the instructions in the hadith, jihad ideology was readily transformable to meet the practical security needs of the community. It would later prove its malleability as a mobilizing tool for political ends, namely the expansion of the Muslim community and the geographic enlargement of the Islamic Empire.

Many scholars describe the jihad as an evolutionary process moving from defensive fighting to offensive warfare paralleling the establishment of the Islamic Empire. In his criticism of the evolutionary theory of jihad, Reuven Firestone argues that the jihad did not evolve so much as it transformed with different variants of jihad, from

⁴⁹ Euben, 13.

⁵⁰ Firestone lists the stages espoused in the “Classic Evolutionary Theory of War” as follows: Stage One: Nonconfrontation, Stage Two: Defensive Fighting, Stage Three: Initiating Attack Allowed but within the Ancient Strictures, Stage Four: Unconditional Command to Fight All Unbelievers. (Firestone, 50-65).

countering heresy to defending Muslim lands from invasion taking place simultaneously throughout history. He describes a “jump rather than a slow evolutionary change” from “mundane war to Holy War.”⁵¹ Firestone’s argument addresses the problem of looking at the development of jihad doctrine as an evolutionary process vice as an adaptable tool that is capable of being shaped to fit specific ideological and pragmatic needs under different circumstances.⁵² This viewpoint more clearly explains the variance and dispersion of jihad ideologies.

F. JIHAD IN PRACTICE

1. Jihad in Early Islam: Bringing Order out of Chaos

The arrival of Islam brought a tremendous shift in the worldview of those who joined its ranks. No longer were the identities of tribe the most important loyalty but rather loyalty to Allah and the Muslim community. While some barriers between people were being torn down, different barriers were developing as the new religion met the resistance of those who still followed the ignorant ways of *jahiliyya*. For Muslims, jihad was the vehicle provided to rid the world of this ignorance and establish an Islamic kingdom on earth.⁵³

The need to bring order out of the chaos of *jahiliyya* was part of the vision that the first Muslims saw. Indeed, the success of Islam in establishing itself on the Arabian Peninsula is held up as proof of the validity of its message.⁵⁴ This interpretation of the success of Islam over the chaos of the *jahiliyya* is an important part of the tradition of belief that Islam is the cure for the ills of the world with jihad as one of the methods by which that cure is administered. In the early stages of the Islamic Empire, “the jihad was therefore employed as an instrument for both the universalization of religion and the

⁵¹ Firestone, 127.

⁵² Ibid., 47-66.

⁵³ Euben, 15.

⁵⁴ Firestone, 41.

establishment of an imperial world state.”⁵⁵ This theme would find further meaning under the sultans of the Ottoman Empire and is a theme that is interwoven throughout the history of Islam.

2. The Establishment of Anti-establishment Jihad

While jihad ideology was serving as the religious political tool for justifying the use of force for the Islamic Empire, another form of the ideology was taking form; it would provide a counter narrative at times to call into question and even overthrow regimes that had erred from the pure path. This iteration of the jihad first appeared during the battle of Siffeen in 657. Ali, the fourth “rightly guided caliph,” had his claim to the caliphate challenged by another claimant to the throne, Muawiyah. As a result, Muawiyah was labeled an apostate and Ali led a punitive coalition to Syria to punish the dissenters and validate his authority.

As the battle raged, Muawiyah sent representatives with Qu’rans attached to their spears to parley with Ali’s forces. A truce was reached, and Muawiyah and his forces were allowed to return unharmed to Syria. While this pragmatic effort saved lives, part of Ali’s coalition, the Kharijites, despised Ali for his compromising “submission to arbitration”⁵⁶ and allowing the apostate, Muawiyah, and his forces to live. In a bold attempt to change three regimes, the Kharijites intended to kill Muawiyah, Ali and the governor of Egypt all on the same day. They only succeeded in killing Ali, leaving Muawiyah to seize the caliphate for himself.⁵⁷

The “pure” ideology of the Kharijites provides an historical precedent for understanding the jihad of dissent. The “rigorous Puritanism and religious fundamentalism”⁵⁸ of the Kharijites are a picture of counter-regime jihad ideology. It is an ideology that places devotion to itself above the rule of men, even men who are

⁵⁵ Khadduri, 51.

⁵⁶ Esposito, *Islam the Straight Path*, 42.

⁵⁷ Glubb, 34-39.

⁵⁸ Esposito, *Islam the Straight Path*, 41.

endowed with Islamic political authority. This strain of the ideology coexisted with the state-centric jihad of the caliphs and would provide a foundation for the principles of the jihad of dissent in the future.

3. Jihad in the Ottoman Empire

Evaluating the justness of a war is an interesting and largely subjective task, especially since historians seem to either eulogize or demonize leaders and nations. In using the established criteria to evaluate the decision making of Ottoman sultans, a basic foundation of the patterns of government of the Ottoman Empire needs to be laid out. The Ottoman Empire was ruled by a series of sultans in a form of government that has been described as being “characterized by a complete reliance on military force and arbitrary power of despotism.”⁵⁹ Such a generalization does not adequately discuss the nuances of the connections between political leadership, religious influence and war.

For the first part of its history, the Ottoman Empire was not a purely Islamic regime as had been the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties or the Safavid dynasty in neighboring Persia, which took a stricter approach to the enforcement of the *shariah*. Since the peoples it conquered were allowed to follow several varieties of faiths or no faith at all, as an empire, the Ottomans did not force major changes on their subjects as long as taxes were paid and order was maintained. In this sense the empire, “was regarded by Muslims of the Arabian heartland as a heretical entity,” by embracing the form of Islam, but not its essence.⁶⁰ Although not viewed with respect initially, the legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire as an Islamic government evolved through various events both internal and external to the empire.

a. The Ottoman Army: Infidels as the Practitioners of Jihad

The soldiers of the army of the Ottoman Empire, the Janissaries, have an almost legendary status in some military history circles. The Janissaries were technically

⁵⁹ Caesar E. Farah, editor, *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*, Kirksville: The Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993, 9.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

a slave army raised from the stock of non-Muslim families since it was unlawful for a freeborn Muslim to be bound as a slave. This system was known as *devshirme* and was designed to train soldiers and civil servants for service to the empire. The power these “slaves” were given virtually negates the Western connotation of the word, but they were ultimately bound by a loyalty to the sultan alone. As part of their training, the Janissaries were trained in Islam and were, by definition, a Muslim army and rightfully authorized according to Islamic tradition to engage in *jihad* and obligated to live by its tenets. In addition to infantry, the Ottoman military consisted of a cavalry force, known as the *sipahi*, comprised horsemen who were bound to the sultan in exchange for control of land. Like the Janissaries, the *sipahi* also were professing Muslims but they were raised outside of the *devshirme* system. Combined with the Janissaries, they provided the Ottoman Empire with a force that would enable the empire to expand across North Africa, deep into the heart of Europe and down to the Persian Gulf.⁶¹ With an army loyal to him alone, the sultan would not have needed the support of his population and could generally initiate warfare without having to activate jihad ideology to raise a force.

b. Establishing the Caliphate and the Legitimate Use of Force

The legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire through the eyes of Islam is a necessary step in evaluating their authority to wage a jihad according to the criteria established by the Qur'an and Islamic tradition. In 1516-17, Sultan Selim I led the Ottoman Army on a series of campaigns that would not only expand the empire, but would validate the legitimacy of the sultanate according to the Islamic faith. Under Selim I, the Ottomans captured the two most holy cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina in the Hijaz on the west coast of Arabia. With these actions, they became the protector of those sites and essentially assumed responsibility for ensuring the safety of Muslims involved with the *hajj*, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca and fifth pillar of Islam. Selim was also able to capture Cairo. After Selim captured Cairo, the reigning caliph there, whose lineage had been maintained since escaping the Mongols, relinquished his title to

⁶¹ Cleveland, 47

Selim. With the two holy cities under their control and the legitimate title of caliph, the Ottoman sultans now had the outward trappings required of a truly Islamic empire.⁶²

Another important step in the growth of the Ottoman Empire and its legitimization in the eyes of Islam was the adherence to the *Seriat*, or *shariah*, a set of “ideals” for governing an Islamic state. As an ideal law, the *shariah* was designed to “put a check on the power of the sovereign”⁶³ and since it was an idea, not a person, it would outlast the sultan. During the first two hundred fifty years of the empire, the rules of the game were more or less established at the behest of the sultan with the conquered territories being governed as those leaders saw fit as long as that did not interfere with the operation of the empire.

The religious credibility of specific sultans is not without controversy. For instance, in one collection of essays on the Ottomans, a writer states, “Mehmed the Conqueror, Selim I, Murat IV, Mahmud II, and Abdulhamit II are considered despotic rulers.”⁶⁴ Another author in the same collection states that “the sultan was not an autocrat, as so glibly stated in many Western texts,” and “no sultan could suspend the *Sheriat*.”⁶⁵ This apparent disparity highlights the point that evaluating whether an Ottoman sultan was a true caliph or not is a matter of historical opinion.

The major territorial expansion of the Ottoman Empire took place predominantly under two sultans, Mehmed II, “the Conqueror” and Suleiman I, “the Magnificent.” A partial review of their campaigns will provide case studies in understanding the nature of jihad during the Ottoman Empire.

c. Mehmed II, the Conqueror

Mehmed Celebi was thrust into the role of sultan around the age of thirteen when his father and predecessor, the sultan Murad II, suddenly abdicated his

⁶² William C. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*. 3d edition. Boulder: Westview Press, 2004, 40-41.

⁶³ Farah, 41.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 15.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 41.

thrown following a great victory over the Hungarians at the battle of Varna. To help mentor the young sultan, the grand vizier, Halil Pasha, became the power behind the throne. The legitimacy of Mehmed's title of sultan-caliph in the eyes of the religious community appears to have been questionable at first. His relationship with the *ulema* had been strained when he was younger as a result of his friendship with a heretical Persian missionary who was eventually burned by the *ulema* for his heresy. As Mehmed grew up, however, he realized the importance of his position as caliph and did take on the responsibility of protector of the faith.⁶⁶

(1) Constantinople: Jihad in the Offense. Not only did Mehmed protect the faith, but under his reign, the greatest blow to Christendom would be dealt in the capture of Constantinople. The initiation of the campaign appears to have been for the purpose of expansion. Although the time period was characterized by warfare, there does not appear to have been an immediate threat from the Byzantines. In fact, the opposite would appear to be true since as Mehmed was advancing, Emperor Constantine sent three separate sets of envoys with gifts to mollify the sultan and uncover his true intentions. Those intentions became blatantly clear when Mehmed beheaded the last group of emissaries that the emperor sent. Mehmed continued his advance on Constantinople and put it under siege. Constantine sent one final message to Mehmed to avoid a battle and maintain control of his city. To his credit, Mehmed did give Constantine the opportunity to surrender the city without a fight. In response, Constantine refused to surrender and Mehmed refused to withdraw from the siege. The assault began.

After a tremendous battle, the Ottomans were able to breach the walls of this formidable city. Upon the seizure of the city, the Ottoman troops massacred significant portions of the population. The troops also took part in plundering the churches and homes of the inhabitants. Mehmed further secured his victory by

⁶⁶ Lord Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries*, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1977, 87-90.

eliminating the remainder of the ruling family to ensure that there were none “among the Byzantine Greeks who could be named King.” As a final sign of the Ottoman victory, the name of the city was changed to Istanbul.⁶⁷

(2) Vlad the Impaler: Jihad in the Defense. In 1462, a unique campaign would be taken by Mehmed to restore unity and civility to one of the vassal states of the empire. The legendary Wallachian Prince Vlad Dracul III, also known as “The Impaler,” and the inspiration for the character Dracula, stopped paying the tribute he was obligated to pay the Ottomans following an agreement with Sultan Murad II. Under the Ottoman system of government, vassal states were allowed to govern as they saw fit, and the horrifically cruel reign of Vlad the Impaler is one of the bloodiest in history. His obscene treatment of his population was apparently not a cause for interference until he stopped paying his tribute, and Mehmed’s intelligence sources began to reveal that Vlad had plans to fight the Ottomans. The Ottomans attempted to capture Vlad and make him pay the tribute. Vlad was warned of their scheme, the plan backfired and Vlad got the upper hand. In his typical fashion, the two Ottomans who made the attempt to capture Vlad had their hands and feet cut off before he had them impaled.⁶⁸

Following the attempt to capture him, Vlad turned his fury on the Ottomans living in Wallachian territory. He had some 25,000 of them impaled, including women and children. Vlad’s open rebellion against Mehmed was further driven home when he nailed the turban to the head of one of the sultan’s messengers. The news of the atrocities to the Ottomans and Vlad’s rebellion provided sufficient justification to call for jihad for the purpose of restoring peace to his territory as well as protecting and avenging its inhabitants.

Mehmed’s campaign against Vlad may be classified as a just jihad since both the reasons for beginning the conflict as well as the conduct of the campaign apparently adheres to the criteria. These actions seem to be in contrast to the siege at Constantinople. Furthermore, the fact that Mehmed allowed Vlad to rule his subjects in

⁶⁷ Franz Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and His Times*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press), 1978, 91-96.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 201-204.

such a cruel manner, and only intervened when he stopped paying tribute to the empire, further taints the justness of the sultan's reign.

d. Suleiman I, the Magnificent

As his title suggests, Sultan Suleiman (1520-1566) accomplished a great many things and brought the Ottoman Empire to its highest point historically. Under his reign, the European capitals of Belgrade and Budapest would come under Ottoman control and the city of Vienna would be besieged once and threatened with siege a second time. A diehard warrior, Suleiman marched with his men on thirteen campaigns and eventually died "with his boots on" on the field of battle.

Suleiman was obligated to the *shariah* and did serve as the sultan-caliph and defender of the Islamic faith. As the tenth Ottoman Sultan, Islamic prophecy and tradition looked at Suleiman as the "‘Perfector of the Perfect Number’ hence the Angel of Heaven." The significance of the number ten as the perfect number relates to the Ten Commandments, the ten parts of the Qur'an, and several other instances of the number ten, to include the number of fingers and toes that a man is born with.⁶⁹ With these credentials, Suleiman undoubtedly met the criteria for being a legitimate caliph according to Islamic principles.

Suleiman would also be given the opportunity to make military decisions based on Islamic principles. As the defender of the faith, as well as being the head of the Ottoman Empire, Suleiman entered a dynamic world of religious and political intrigue, which frequently manifested itself in war. The European powers controlled by Charles V, Francis I and Henry VIII were in a steady struggle for the control of Europe, and these Christian armies were in regular contact with the armies of the Ottomans. Within this framework, Christian powers also looked to the Ottomans to occasionally create a "sacrilegious union of the Lily and the Crescent,"⁷⁰ as they vied for control. The use of

⁶⁹ Kinross, 173.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 174.

jihad during this time period indicates that it was a malleable religious tool that could be used by the sultan to take the Ottomans to war whether in defense of Islam or for the expansion of the empire.

4. Jihad in the Islamic Nation State: The Rise of Saudi Arabia

The rise of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is deeply intertwined with the ideology of jihad. As wars make states, so the jihad aided tremendously in the creation of the Kingdom. The process began early in the eighteenth century when a radical Muslim scholar named Ibn Wahhab reinvigorated jihad ideology. He partnered with an Arabian chieftain named Muhammad Ibn Saud who was looking to expand his territory. “Armed with a new dogma,”⁷¹ and new muskets, Saud’s force took large portions of the Arabian Peninsula including the seizure of both Mecca and Medina from the Turks. In taking Mecca, the Wahhabis demonstrated their religious ferocity by destroying the tomb of Muhammad, whose gravesite, for them, had become a symbol of idolatry.⁷²

As Muhammad Ibn Saud and the Wahhabis were enjoying their victory, however, their actions did not sit well with the Turkish sultan. He tasked Mehmed Ali, the Egyptian Sultan, “to recover the holy cities.”⁷³ On their third attempt, the Turks successfully unseated the Wahhabis in 1817. Wahhab was captured and, as a last-minute insult to his extreme legalism, he “was forced to listen to the hated music of a guitar before he was executed.”⁷⁴ This defeat left a power vacuum on the peninsula, which was filled by a political rival to the Sauds, the Ibn Rashid family.

World War I would provide a political opportunity opening for the House of Saud to make a return to power. Prior to the war, Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman bin Faisal al-Saud (known as Ibn Saud in most Western countries) had continued the religious political alliance between the House of Saud and the Wahhabis. Together they waged jihad and

⁷¹ George F. Nafziger and Mark W. Walton, *Islam at War: A History*, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003, 74.

⁷² Ibid., 75.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

took over Riyadh and killed the governor Ibn Rashid had left in charge. During the war, Ibn Saud created a partnership with the English, who were at war with the Turks. When the war ended, a secularizing power replaced the Turkish sultanate and “Ataturk’s abolition of the caliphate in 1924,”⁷⁵ removed the religious authority for waging state centric jihad.

Ibn Rashid seized the moment and proclaimed himself “Caliph of all Islam.”⁷⁶ Here the ideology of dissent reappeared as Ibn Saud and his Wahhabi allies, known as the Ikhwan, considered Rashid’s assumption a blasphemy. They waged jihad on the House of Rashid until defeating them in 1925. Ibn Saud was declared “King of the Hijaz” in Mecca in January 1928. The army of Ikhwan combined with the House of Saud and established a kingdom where this ideology became its source of its power. The jihad of dissent had helped to create a state and the Ikhwan continued to serve as the “shock troops”⁷⁷ for the Sauds.

After a gestation period, however, the jihad ideology, which had established the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, would come back to challenge it. As a political ruler operating within the geography of the Arabian Peninsula, King Saud needed to control the Ikhwan, who continued to employ their bloody methods of forcefully converting unbelievers throughout the Arabian Peninsula. The Ikhwan “detested the king’s alliance with Britain and his extravagantly polygamous lifestyle,”⁷⁸ and derided his lack of zeal in finishing the purification of the peninsula. To counter the Ikhwan, Ibn Saud sought out the blessing of the religious community. They granted the king “the sole power to declare jihad,”⁷⁹ a power he used, in conjunction with British aircraft, to quell the fury of the Ikhwan and consolidate his rule over the kingdom.

⁷⁵ Kepel, 43.

⁷⁶ Nafziger, 76.

⁷⁷ Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2006, 62.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 62.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 63.

The case of Saudi Arabia demonstrates both how jihad may be used to establish a nation state and how it can become the force that challenges the authority of the nation state. The jihad of the state and the jihad of the anti-state may appear in the same timeframe and in the same geography. Both forms apply religious rhetoric; however, while state-centric jihad becomes a tool in the hands of an earthly ruler, the jihad of dissent respects no earthly authority that it sees as operating outside of the will of Allah.

5. Jihad in the Modern World: Ideological Transformation

The development of jihad ideology, from the days of the early Islamic Empires through the age of Islamic nation states and finally to its current state, has been discussed in numerous post-September 11 books, such as Fawaz Gerges' *Why Jihad Went Global*, Marc Sageman's *Understanding Terrorist Networks* and Lawrence Wright's *The Looming Tower*. A brief synopsis of this gestation period of jihad ideology shows the geographic leapfrogging and transformation across the political landscapes of the Middle East.

The most notable contributor to this transformation was an Egyptian named Sayyed Qutb, whose book, *Milestones*, was published in 1964. Qutb developed and challenged the concept of a modern day *jahiliyya* that had come about because of an “absence of values”⁸⁰ in the Western world and had trickled down into the Muslim world. This milieu was continued under the secular Egyptian regime of Gamel Abdul Nasser. Qutb would advocate a jihad by the faithful to restore the *ummah*. His message of jihad against unjust Muslim rulers, further reinforced by his execution, or “martyrdom,” was picked up by Ayman al-Zawahiri, whose influence and partnership with Osama Bin Laden — and their development of the global jihad franchise — have been well studied.

Operationally, the ideology of jihad has transformed over time, much like the tactics and techniques of warfare have themselves been adapted in response to political, technological, economic and cultural changes that haven taken place throughout history.

⁸⁰ Wright, 29-30.

A recent book about the new global terrorism describes to how the language of jihad can be interwoven with the mindset of today's violent non-state actors:

Although interstate combat has become rare, internal conflict involving non-state actors — insurgents, terrorists, brigands, warlords, ethnic militias, and so on — has become quite common. Such conflict can take several forms: revolutionary (or fundamentalist) struggles to replace existing authorities with more ideologically (or religiously) “correct” regimes.⁸¹

This discussion has an interesting parallel with the concept of generational warfare, which describes the transformation of warfare over time. According to generational warfare theory, the world is currently seeing what is known as fourth generation warfare (4GW), which is largely asymmetrical in its conduct. Those who practice this new generation of warfare, “focus on a long-term strategic approach. They focus on winning wars, not battles.”⁸² Although this approach to warfare is not unique to the twenty-first century — and the history of warfare cannot easily be segmented into clear cut “generations,” — there have undoubtedly been transformations in the nature of warfare, to include its ideological component. The global jihad has embraced the forms of warfare described in the 4GW concept. The effectiveness of this movement is evidenced by its ability to harness the tools of globalization which have greatly improved the means by which jihad may be waged.

G. CONCLUSION

In declaring a jihad, certain criteria had to be met to validate that, in the minds of those engaging in the jihad, they were in fact on the *good* or *just* side of the conflict. Here a comparison may be drawn between the ideology of jihad and Western Just War theory, which lays out principles that nations should consider in evaluating the justifications for engaging in a particular conflict. Adhering to these criteria or principles is necessary for maintaining an aura of justness for the jihad within the minds of the

⁸¹ Michael T. Klare, “The New Face of Combat: Terrorism and Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century”, *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 29.

⁸² Thomas X. Hammes, *On War in the 21st Century*, St. Paul, Minnesota: Zenith Press, 2006, 222.

participants. Understanding this criteria, and how it has been applied by various participants responding to different situations, is essential for interpreting the ideology of jihad.

It is an understatement to say that the study of religion, like the study of politics, draws a vast array of conflicting viewpoints. In the study of jihad, these two spheres overlap; This is because Islam encompasses guidance pertaining to the conduct of politics, including warfare, in its scriptures and subsequently in its implementation. This guidance has been reviewed by numerous experts who have come up with as many conclusions. The controversial subject of jihad has yet to be settled, and it remains a field that requires further study.

The language of jihad has existed for centuries. While the word in Western ears typically evokes images of violence, as a word which means struggle, it can be applied to many situations, most importantly, the inner battle against one's own temptations. The military aspect of jihad has foundations in the Qur'an as well as other Islamic sources, such as the *hadith*, or sayings of Muhammad. While the majority of scholarly work on Islam may take these Qur'anic verses in their entirety with a view to understanding their context and interpretation, it is also apparent that the Qur'anic scriptures pertaining to jihad are ripe for manipulation by those who use "selective quotes from the Qur'an to support their positions,"⁸³ and justify their actions in some religious shroud.

⁸³ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, 17.

III. JIHAD IN THE HANDS OF INFIDELS: THE AFGHAN JIHAD

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter looks at how jihad ideology was adopted following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the narrative of dissent for a local population as well as the rallying cry for the Muslim world to defend the faith. This struggle transformed the international image of Islam, weakened the once powerful Soviet Union and contributed to bringing an end to the Cold War. A minor player in the international scene, the country of Afghanistan became the site of one of many Cold War proxy battles that took place between the Soviet Union and the United States. For America, it became a battle against communism and a chance for revenge by making the Soviet Union “pay a high price in blood for their support of the North Vietnamese.”⁸⁴

Not only was this a struggle between superpowers; for the Afghans, it became a holy war and a battle to reclaim their homeland, an “Anti-Soviet”⁸⁵ or “Afghan Jihad.”⁸⁶ The mobilization for the call to jihad occurred not only amongst the local Afghan population, but also resonated around the Muslim world where many saw in that ideology an opportunity to travel abroad, defend their faith and become a vaunted mujahadeen.

The Afghan Jihad would also give the Sunni monarchies of the Persian Gulf an opportunity to enhance their religious credentials against the twin challenges of Shiism and the revolutionary ideals being exported from the Islamic Republic of Iran.⁸⁷ The alliance against the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan mobilized a diverse cast of

⁸⁴ Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *Afghanistan-The Bear Trap*. Havertown, Pennsylvania: Casemate, 1992, 79.

⁸⁵ David Busby Edwards. “Origins of the Anti-Soviet Jihad” *Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987, 21.

⁸⁶ Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Belknap Press, 2002, 137.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 137.

players with a mix of ideologies, resources and motivations. These alliances of opportunity provide a valuable case study for applying the tenets of Social Mobilization Theory (SMT).

The Afghan Jihad has been analyzed through different lenses. With the onset of September 11 and the global jihad, however, the events, personalities and ideologies that influenced the Afghan Jihad should continue to be studied for an understanding of the causal factors that have contributed to the mobilizing capacity and resonance of jihad ideology in the past.

B. GIVING JIHAD A CHANCE: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE SOVIET INVASION

According to SMT, the conditions for group mobilization occur when there is a shift in political opportunity structures. As Glenn Robinson points out, this may come in the form of “changes in international structures (e.g., globalizations, the demise of the USSR, attention or inattention by foreign powers).”⁸⁸ Within the context of the Cold War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought this attention in the form of the two superpowers: the Soviet Union and the United States. This created the type of change in political opportunity structure that SMT argues provides the impetus for social movements to develop to challenge the status quo. To explain this phenomenon, it is important to look at the nature and conduct of the Soviet Union to understand why the struggle was framed in religious phraseology. Also, there needs to be an analysis of why that particular ideological frame was effective in the Afghan situation.

1. Regime Change in Kabul

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which took place on 27 December 1979, violently and decisively changed Afghan political opportunities. Following a series of coups begun in 1973, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) had assumed power at the time of the invasion under the leadership of Hafizullah Amin, a problematic partner for the Soviets. The PDPA “relied on Soviet, not Afghan,

⁸⁸ Robinson, 116.

experience” so much so that they “became ever more alienated from their own people.”⁸⁹ The presence of Soviet advisors had steadily increased as part of the “swift absorption of Afghanistan into the Soviet bloc.”⁹⁰ Scattered Afghan resistance to the PDPA and its Soviet handlers was already underway prior to the invasion, including an uprising in Herat, which, with the help of Soviet air power, was repressed after killing an estimated 25,000 people. This resistance had not yet “spread to the national level”⁹¹ at the time the Soviets decided to implement a regime change in Kabul.

Under the guise of coming to the rescue of the PDPA to help it quell the rebellion and prepare it for the supposedly impending invasion by the United States,⁹² the invasion made the Soviet presence in Afghanistan blatantly more formal as they quickly toppled their former partner, Amin, killing his sons and all of the palace guard, some 1,800 troops. The Soviets replaced Amin with Babrak Karmal of the communist *Khalqi* “Masses” party. Repression under the PDPA had been indiscriminate and cruel, but it was still the work of Afghans against other Afghans. When the Soviets arrived en masse, the resistance movements, which by that time had “an extended period of mass organizing and mobilization”⁹³ against the PDPA regime, were now ripened for large-scale revolution. Support for the revolution steadily increased among the Afghan population —now it was a foreign occupier, like the British and Russians who had manipulated Afghan politics in the past, who was doing so again. What had been an internal struggle against the PDPA regime “turned into a war of liberation only with the arrival of the Soviet troops.”⁹⁴

The Soviet invasion did not happen in a vacuum, and was not the only factor leading to the resistance, which generally took the form of an anti-Soviet jihad.

⁸⁹ Hassan M. Kakar, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995, 15.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 87.

⁹¹ Gilles Dorronsoro, *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present*. Columbia University Press, New York, 2005, 97.

⁹² Kakar, 46.

⁹³ Mohammed M. Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003, 104.

⁹⁴ Edwards, 21.

Dissension among the tribes toward the regime in Kabul had existed for some time in response to reforms they had attempted to enact. What the Soviet invasion brought was a drastic shift in the character of the regime through the direct intervention of a foreign invader in a predominantly Muslim country. Furthermore, the presence of Soviet troops in their towns was making it painfully apparent to “ordinary Afghans that atheists had occupied their homeland.”⁹⁵

This intervention created a major change in the status quo of the political opportunity structure, giving various Islamist groups the impetus to rally greater numbers to their cause. In the early 1970s, some of these groups were already advocating a jihad against the government; however, “this call produced no response”⁹⁶ and a coordinated attack by the Islamists in 1975 met with defeat as there was no popular support for their efforts. After December 1979, however, the immediate problem of the Soviet Army presented a new political opportunity for the Islamist groups to recruit more of the population, now sufficiently angered to the point of taking action, to answer their calls for jihad. The invasion also emboldened groups and leaders with more traditional or moderate positions to organize collective action against the intruder in order to make changes in the status quo.

2. The Soviet Counterinsurgency: Repression, Genocide and Backlash

Faced with a growing resistance, the Soviets were caught in what Ronald Francisco has called “The Dictator’s Dilemma,” which is essentially a question of the degree of repression a regime needs to implement to squash dissent.⁹⁷ Having failed to gain popular support for their reforms, the Soviets and their Afghan partners took repression to the extreme and “embarked on a program of genocide.”⁹⁸ Unable to squelch the resistance, the Soviets responded by indiscriminately decimating the Afghan population with shelling, aerial mining and chemical weapons, as well as scorched earth

⁹⁵ Kakar, 113.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 88-90.

⁹⁷ Ronald A. Francisco, “The Dictator’s Dilemma,” *Repression and Mobilization*. Edited by Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston and Carol Mueller. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005, 58.

⁹⁸ Kakar, 213.

tactics, in an effort to get the population to “pressure the mujahadeen not to attack the invaders.”⁹⁹ Faced with the choice of dying from a Soviet bombardment or running to the hills to join the mujahadeen, many Afghans would follow Mohammad Hafez’s assertion that a population that has gone through a period of institutional exclusion will mobilize. When this mobilized population faces reactive indiscriminate repression and is left without peaceful alternatives, a large-scale rebellion is likely to ensue.¹⁰⁰

Such heavy-handed approaches by the Soviets resulted in a backlash from the Afghans since “consistent repression necessarily increases the amount of revolutionary zeal”¹⁰¹ in a population. While there had been resistance to the communist reforms being made when the PDPA reigned in Kabul, it was the indiscriminate and violent repression carried out by the PDPA and later the Soviets which created the necessity and justification, in the mind of the Afghan population, to collectively take up arms against the invaders. Now the enemy was not only a godless invader, but was also seen as inordinately cruel, requiring little, if any, exaggeration to convince the population of the need to take part in jihad against such an evil power.

While the purity of the initial call to jihad was essential to contrast the righteous mujahadeen with the godless communists, over the course of the decade of resistance “ideological frontiers between Islamists and fundamentalists had a tendency to become blurred.”¹⁰² Likewise, the support provided to these groups pragmatically overlooked their proclaimed ideologies in the interest of bringing down the Soviet bear. The collective desire to defeat the Soviets provided the political opportunity for the various groups, both fundamentalist and traditionalist, to capture resources from external sources that, in the absence of the Soviet invasion, might not have rendered such support otherwise.

⁹⁹ Kakar, 226.

¹⁰⁰ Hafez, 104.

¹⁰¹ Francisco, 67.

¹⁰² Dorronsoro, 150.

C. MOBILIZING FOR THE JIHAD: THE IMPORTANCE OF MOSQUES, MULLAHS AND ISLAMIST PARTIES

The Islamic religious establishment in Afghanistan had been an integral part of culture and politics before the communist coup. Prior to the PDPA takeover, “Afghan monarchs enjoyed the support of the religious establishment”¹⁰³ and the *ulema*, the professional, scholarly religious class, were connected with the affairs of the state. In fact, most of them were on the state’s payroll. For the PDPA, “a new social order could not be but in place until the old order had been liquidated.”¹⁰⁴ This meant dismembering the traditional structures of Afghan society, including its religious component.

The communist coup of 1973 established a form of government that bypassed these traditional structures in order to establish a new Afghan state modeled after the Soviet Union. Since communism views religions as antiquated — one of Marxism’s tenets being that religion only serves as an opiate to the masses, theoretically keeping the masses compliant and lethargic while the elites of society took advantage of their ignorant piety — the Afghan religious establishment of *ulema* and *mullahs* had to be placed on the sidelines.

1. The Local Afghan Jihad

In the rural areas, the *mullahs* — “religious functionaries with little or no education”¹⁰⁵ who oversaw the daily lives of the rural population — were seen as the most qualified “to interpret government policies” and the “natural arbitrator of communal values,”¹⁰⁶ highlighting their influence on the life of the average Afghan. There was not necessarily a close structural connection between the *ulema* and the *mullahs*, but each had significant influence at their respective levels of society.

¹⁰³ Sultan A. Aziz, “Leadership Dilemmas: Challenges and Responses.” *Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival*. Edited by Grant M. Farr and John G. Merriam. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987, 56.

¹⁰⁴ Edwards, 29.

¹⁰⁵ Kakar, 141.

Rather than compromise their ideology, and perhaps framing their arguments for reform to account for these traditional religious power brokers, the communists grossly misread the population. They made enemies of the very leaders who had the credentials to undercut their every move and their “attacks against respected religious figures were viewed as assaults against the culture at large and caused...a recessive part of cultural identity (i.e., being Muslims) to become the dominant feature.”¹⁰⁷ Later in the conflict, the communist regime would eventually realize their error and attempt to become “the protector of Islam.” In an interesting turn of events, the communists recognized the potency of jihad ideology and, “the struggle against the guerillas became a *jihad*.”¹⁰⁸

Initial resistance “did not mobilize against the communist government in the name of an ideology,”¹⁰⁹ but the anti-Soviet cause found its roots in religious organizations from the start. Throughout the reign of the PDPA and following the Soviet invasion, the communists had marginalized the power base of the traditional tribal structure as well as making “attempts to neutralize the religious factor in public perception”¹¹⁰ by castigating the the *ulema*, or religious elite. While in the seat of government, the PDPA made significant adjustments in property rights, the role of women and other changes, forcibly adjusting the Afghan way of life almost overnight “without the complicity and support of established religious figures to whom the people looked for advice and consent.”¹¹¹

Prior to the Soviet invasion, the religious institutions served as the base for several unconnected rebellions across Afghanistan against the communist regime in

¹⁰⁶ Aziz, 57.

¹⁰⁷ Edwards, 42-43.

¹⁰⁸ Dorronsoro, 179.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 105.

¹¹⁰ Edwards, 42.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 42.

Kabul in the spring of 1979. These revolts were not well-organized initially, but there was a “collective definition of targets”¹¹² and a clear influence by the religious establishment on the rebellion:

On the morning of 15 March the peasants of the surrounding area gathered around the mosques together with the townsmen and, encouraged by the *mullahs*, converged on Herat, attacking all the symbols of the state and of communism indiscriminately.¹¹³

Even the local Afghan army garrison joined this revolt. As in prior rebellions, such as those against the British, the *mullahs* had provided the rhetoric and “an efficient network for the transmission of information”¹¹⁴ needed to flesh out the forces that would physically wage the jihad.

The *mullahs* and *ulema* were the backbone of the resistance; as spiritual leaders, they were the only individuals with the recognized authority to call for a jihad. The *mullahs* had different degrees of power, depending upon the tribal communities in which they served. Those *mullahs* who operated amongst the Pushtun tribes, the largest ethnicity group in Afghanistan¹¹⁵, typically were involved only in “clerical duties.” However, for the Pushtuns, in the event of a war, “the leadership role...shifts from the Khan to the mullah.”¹¹⁶ The standing and importance of these religious leaders increased dramatically as the population recognized that the PDPA had “proven itself to be an infidel government,”¹¹⁷ and moved closer to Islam for its sense of identity. For a Marxist, the impossible was about to happen in its Afghanistan experiment: Religion was about to become its undoing.

¹¹² Javier Auyero. “Relational Riot: Austerity and Corruption Protest in the Neoliberal Era.” *Social Movement Studies* 2. no. 2 (2003), 131.

¹¹³ Dorronsoro, 99.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 106.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 14-15.

¹¹⁶ Aziz, 57.

¹¹⁷ Edwards, 43.

2. The Islamist Party: A New Face for Tradition

In addition to the traditional *mullahs* and *ulema*, various Islamist groups, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's *Hizb-i Islami*¹¹⁸ or "Islamic Party,"¹¹⁹ also became rallying points for anti-PDPA and, later, anti-Soviet actions. As political actors, the Islamist groups had already developed in their ability to organize collective action for protest and even violence. The Islamist groups were the first to wage an "armed struggle" against the Kabul regime in 1973 as it was warming up to the communists. As such, "they had acquired legitimacy,"¹²⁰ and were a natural starting point for those who wanted to join the resistance. Olivier Roy notes a key difference in the character of the various uprisings started by ordinary Afghans unaffiliated with Islamist organizations; they were "spontaneous." In contrast, the resistance efforts by the Islamist groups "tended to go underground" in order to conduct more organized and deliberate actions.¹²¹

While the call for a jihad resonated across Afghanistan, it is an exaggeration to say that the resistance was united throughout the campaign against the Soviets. The mobilization for the Afghan jihad, however, should be seen more as a series of what one SMT author calls "micro mobilizations"¹²² of individuals who would band together or operate independently of each other with their only common ground being that they had experienced similar grievances stemming from a shared foe. The Soviet invasion created

¹¹⁸ The *Hezb-i Islami* originated from a small group of students at Kabul University in 1966. Like other student groups, such as the Marxists, Maoists and others, they saw a need to change the Afghan political situation. They believed political Islam was the ideological vehicle that should bring about this change. The party went through various stages of resistance and growth eventually becoming one of the key Islamist parties waging jihad against the Soviet Union following its invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

¹¹⁹ Olivier Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*. Second Edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, 78.

¹²⁰ Tahir Amin, "Afghan Resistance: Past, Present, and Future," *Asian Survey*, Volume 24, No. 4. (April, 1984), 382.

¹²¹ Roy, 106-107.

¹²² William Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action." *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, editors. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992, 71-72.

the type of “national crisis” in which “Islam has provided the rallying point for otherwise disunited groups”¹²³ to band together.

Attempts at alliances were made in response to internal pressure from Afghan refugees who “demanded a united front to coordinate military activities.” These various alliances took on titles such as the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, the Union of the Three, the Union of the Seven and the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen; however, none of these was “destined to last.”¹²⁴ Nonetheless, these groups, while they never truly allied for any extended period of time, did partner occasionally for mutual support and “showed an opposition to foreign intruders that transcended religious, linguistic, and ethnic boundaries.”¹²⁵ Although these groups shared a hatred for the Soviet Union, they had different visions of what Afghanistan should look like after the atheists were driven out.

3. Universal Jihad: The Global Ummah Mobilizes for the Afghan Cause

The various Afghan tribes and groups were not the only individuals mobilized for waging jihad. The call spread into the Arab world through the imams whose messages painted the image of the Soviet Union as a godless, atheistic foe who was now treading on land that had shamelessly been taken from the Islamic world. In Saudi Arabia, an ally of the United States, the jihad was directly encouraged through the network of Wahhabi mosques without fear of losing American support. In response, young Arab men rallied to the call. The mosques became recruitment centers, and “Jeddah became a transit station for...the Afghan jihad.”¹²⁶ For the Saudi political leadership, the consequence of fanning Wahhabi activism for the jihad was that it now had to sugarcoat its relationship with the United States, “making sure that the Soviet Union would replace America as their principal scapegoat.”¹²⁷

¹²³ Edwards, 41.

¹²⁴ Kakar, 92.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 119.

¹²⁶ Wright, 97.

¹²⁷ Kepel, 137.

In other Arab nations with ties with the Soviet Union, mobilization for the jihad became problematic under the auspices of the state. This was evidenced by the decision of the January 1981 Organization of the Islamic Conference to not declare a jihad on behalf of Afghanistan.¹²⁸ While these Muslim states refused to call a jihad for the Afghan cause, “transnational Islamic religious networks”¹²⁹ had no qualms about supporting a holy war against the atheistic Soviet Union.

Networks such as the Muslim Brotherhood were already established in these countries in opposition to their regimes. The opportunity to rally to the cause of fellow Muslims, in contrast to the inaction of their regimes, helped build their Islamist credentials. The ideology of jihad would resound clearly through these organizations and the purity of fighting for an Islamic cause on behalf of their coreligionists would be an opportunity that many enthusiastically could not refuse.

D. FRAMING THE AFGHAN JIHAD: EXCLUSIVE IDEOLOGY AND PRAGMATIC COMPROMISE

During the Afghan Jihad, a local resistance would take place as well as draw in external forces that would rally along religious lines to fight a political foe in a foreign land. Following the Soviet invasion, a local resistance had broken out among the Afghans yet they were lacking sufficient resources and organization to wage war effectively. Fortunately for the Afghan resistance, their struggle would not go unnoticed by the other world superpower and rival of the Soviet Union: the United States. The truism that *my enemies’ enemy is my friend* provided the Afghan resistance several unique marriages of opportunity with some unlikely partners.

Although the Soviets claimed to have been invited by the PDPA, their actions broadcast to the world a different message. The invasion was condemned by the United States and other Western nations. Even Hollywood supported the Afghan Jihad as James Bond,¹³⁰ Rambo¹³¹ and others took up arms with the mujahadeen against the Soviets on

¹²⁸ Kepel, 139.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 139.

¹³⁰ Movie database IMDB, <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0093428/>, accessed on April 9, 2007.

the silver screen. A range of other unlikely international actors, including China, Iran¹³² and Egypt¹³³ also indirectly supported the resistance. The various religious orders, including the Sufis,¹³⁴ Sunnis, Shi'a, and various Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah, also found sympathy or political opportunity with the anti-Soviet cause. These nations and groups tended to back Afghan groups that shared their ideological visions.

The success of the Afghan Jihad would depend upon framing the cause of the Afghan resistance such that it would enable the mobilization of a fighting force as well as provide for the effective organization and equipping of that force. Ironically, while the framing for jihad itself would call for the most extreme type of pious devotion, the supplying of the jihad would require some ideological compromise.

1. Clash of Ideologies: Communism versus Islam

Instead of rallying to the communist calls spouted from the regime in Kabul — to stand up to Western imperialism — the Afghans were turning to Islam. While divided along ethnic, tribal and religious lines, they still found sanctuary in their religious institutions and leaders, even more so as their way of life was being forcibly changed to align Afghan life with the ideology of communism.

The leftist Afghan groups, which had helped with the Marxist coup, saw opportunity in the new changes. However, the majority of Afghans only saw their culture being decimated and their property being redistributed without receiving anything in return, all in the name of some new vision. Although the PDPA vanguard had been able to seize Kabul, the masses did not rally to their cause as had occurred in other communist revolutions. Rather than endearing themselves to the Afghan population by revealing the

¹³¹ Movie database IMDB, <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0095956/>, accessed on April 9, 2007.

¹³² Kakar, 95.

¹³³ Merriam, 71-101.

¹³⁴ Kepel, 140.

great utopian tenets of Marxist socialism, the communist regime was creating enemies among a religious leadership who could truly mobilize the masses under an ideology that was everything but an opiate.

The sudden and drastic changes brought on with the reforms “deeply effected the so called traditional population”¹³⁵ who did not see the changes in the same light as the regime had hoped. The Soviet invasion only galvanized the population further against the foreign ideology of communism. In response to force-fed communism, the population returned to traditional Islam, as well as a new Islamist ideology that had developed from “a campus study group...into a powerful...political party.”¹³⁶ Both traditional Islam and its fundamentalist variant would help to weaponize the religious organizations against the Soviets and their puppet regime in Kabul.

Islam had traditionally served to legitimize the Afghan political system. When it was suddenly sidelined by the PDPA, and later the Soviets, it became the voice of dissent for those that had not bought into the communist frames. When the Afghan *ulema* responded, they spoke to the conscience and emotions of individual Muslims by tapping into the powerful rhetoric and framing potential of jihad ideology. The presence of the Soviets, coupled with their repressive treatment of the Afghans, gave credence to the picture of them as unholy invaders and ones whom every true Muslim had a personal duty to fight. When couched in jihad terminology, the “the rebellion took on a universal nature,”¹³⁷ and the godless Soviets became the religious target for individuals to participate against in collective action.

Whether the frame of jihad ideology against the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul would have eventually led to a full scale mobilization against the PDPA had the Soviets not invaded is an interesting historical “what if” debate. The failure of the Islamist revolt to gather popular support in 1975 perhaps demonstrates that their ideology would

¹³⁵ Aziz, 63.

¹³⁶ David B. Edwards, “Summoning Muslims: Print, Politics, and Religious Ideology in Afghanistan,” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 52, No. 3. (August 1993), 610.

¹³⁷ Dorronsoro, 107

continue to fall on deaf ears. It is apparent, however, that the Soviet invasion unquestionably validated the frame that infidel foreigners were killing the ummah and the faithful needed to mobilize and defend them.

As the advocates who had identified the communist threat from the beginning, the Islamists could frame themselves as the truth tellers. Instead of being *the boy who cried wolf*, they were now seen as the protectors of the country — somewhat like Winston Churchill who, having been sidelined as a warmonger, was vindicated and thrust into power after Hitler's invasion of Poland. Churchill was viewed as the one who had seen the writing on the wall since the beginning.

An important part of framing the call for jihad was the understanding that it was a call for integrity and purity, in contrast to the face of evil. While the communist ideology may in time have resonated with the population, the conduct of the regime in implementing their reforms was seen as a “purposeful falsehood” and a “moral outrage legitimating the act of rebellion.”¹³⁸ The conduct of the mujahadeen during the course of the Afghan jihad was by no means above reproach; however, for the sake of the initial call to arms, the jihad had to be viewed as a just and holy war, framed in terms of good and evil. The ideology needed to be convincing enough to draw recruits willing to rise up and lay down their lives for their fellow Muslims, who were being slaughtered by a cruel oppressor. What better way to draw recruits willing to kill and die in the name of God than to show them that their enemy is a truly godless foe?

2. The Domestic Jihad: Cultural Framing within Afghanistan

In the Afghan case, the Soviet invasion gave clear evidence of the need to wage a defensive jihad, giving the rebellion a religious component that would stir the masses to action. The framing for the jihad inside Afghanistan needed to integrate two ideological components:

Islam provided the symbolic background and the basis for legitimization, but traditional tribal values structured the actual response, a fact the

¹³⁸ Edwards, 39.

narrator also understood as he invoked ancestral memory in conjunction with Islamic law charging the tribesmen with their responsibility to God and their fathers.¹³⁹

Familiar myths were discussed, and tapes and pamphlets were distributed throughout Afghanistan to give the ideology legs. The urgency of the call to jihad grew in proportion with the oppression of the regime.

a. Pamphlets and Tapes: The Medium as Part of the Message

In the decade prior to the Afghan Jihad, Islamist groups distributed pamphlets against the Afghan regime as a component of their recruiting strategy. These pamphlets “awakened student interest in Islam in the late 1960s.”¹⁴⁰ In their pursuit of a following, they were locked in an ideological tug-of-war with the ideas “being advanced by the rival Marxist groups”¹⁴¹ who were also advocating changes in the government. Although the literacy rate in Afghanistan was quite low, pamphlets were distributed throughout the country to pass on the message of resistance to the regime in Kabul through the power of Islam. Those who could read were able to pass on the message to those who could not, and so the ideology was able to spread.

The secret distribution of these pamphlets and tapes throughout Afghanistan added to the subversive nature of the anti-regime cause. The very need for stealth demonstrated the oppressive nature of the regime; being caught with one “constituted an act of treason.”¹⁴² These pamphlets were specifically designed for distribution and could be readily “disposed of if necessary.” The *Hezb-i Islami* pamphlet, *We and Our Summons*, written around 1979, was made of better material and a marked

¹³⁹ Edwards, *Origins of the Anti-Soviet Jihad*, 43.

¹⁴⁰ David B. Edwards, “Summoning Muslims: Print, Politics, and Religious Ideology in Afghanistan,” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Volume 52, No. 3. (August 1993), 610.

¹⁴¹ Edwards, 616.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 624.

improvement upon earlier pamphlets. These pamphlets and their “subversive potential”¹⁴³ would help frame the covert nature of the resistance and quicken the spreading of the message.

Perhaps the most important contribution of these pamphlets was that they “brought Islam out of the traditional madrasahs.”¹⁴⁴ These pamphlets provided a resource for students and others to refer to when debating with other students or for personal development. Not only did they provide guidance for personal living in line with Islamic tenets, but they laid the ideological foundations for revolution under the banner of jihad.

b. Historical Foundations and the Myths of Jihad

Some of these pamphlets were arguably for the “perpetuation of the party itself,”¹⁴⁵ in the case of *Hezb-i Islami*, but much of the propaganda was geared towards educating the local populations on the “discourse and values that are considered appropriate for a time of jihad.”¹⁴⁶ The tapes and pamphlets expounded familiar myths about jihad at the time of Mohammad, designed in a dramatic format with emotional music such that listeners often responded in tears. One story, which demonstrated a change in the role of women during times of jihad, speaks of a woman named Nasia whose son had been killed at the battle of Uhud. During the same battle, she avenged his death by cutting his killer in half with a sword. For this, she received the praise of Mohammad, including a promise that she would be his neighbor in paradise.¹⁴⁷

These tapes and pamphlets prepared the Afghans for war. Myths, such as the story of Nasia, would have similar emotional effects on the population — much like the story of Molly Pitcher, who had taken her husband’s place in a cannon crew after he

¹⁴³ Edwards, 627.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 616.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 628.

¹⁴⁶ Audrey C. Shalinsky, “Women’s Roles in the Afghanistan Jihad,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 4. (November 1993), 661.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 668.

had fallen at the battle of Monmouth, would have had during the American Revolution. Such stories gave the ideology a personal and physical aspect that the population could relate to and emulate.

3. The Afghan Jihad Becomes Universal: Framing the Global Ummah

One of the ideologues who joined the cause of the Afghan jihad was a Palestinian cleric named Sheik Abdullah Azzam. A trained member of the *ulema*, the Islamic clergy, he spoke with religious authority to a global audience.¹⁴⁸ To aid their cause, Azzam crafted “the legend of the Afghan holy warriors” such that it could be “packaged and sold all over the world.”¹⁴⁹ Coming to the aid of the Afghans was not necessarily a sufficient cause to rally warriors from a global population. When Azzam made it an Islamic issue, however, it became “not simply an ideological alternative...but a theological and political imperative.”¹⁵⁰ Writing for a universal Muslim audience, his ideas resonated in mosques throughout the world. He unified his audience by fanning the flames of the “Islamic World Jihad movement” as a place where “all races participated...and the goal was one: that the word of Allah is raised the highest.”¹⁵¹ While his religious credentials were arguably limited, Azzam aimed to draw on established Islamic institutions to mobilize a force that could liberate Afghanistan.

As part of his framing techniques to make the Afghan Jihad a universal Islamic cause, Azzam needed to describe the urgency of the situation, ensuring that for the mujahadeen, the jihad remained a pure battle being waged for the sake of the Muslim *ummah* as a whole. The rhetoric of fundamentalism can be found when he claims that the nations “die only with their desires and their lusts,” and the *ummah* can only continue to

¹⁴⁸ Azzam received a doctorate in Islamic jurisprudence from al-Azhar University in Cairo. He served on the faculty at the University of Jordan and also led prayers at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah. His interest in the Afghan jihad led him to find a teaching position at the International Islamic University in Islamabad, Pakistan. Lawrence, *The Looming Tower*, 95.

¹⁴⁹ Wright, 96.

¹⁵⁰ John L. Esposito, “Contemporary Islam: Reformation or Revolution?” *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, 19.

¹⁵¹ Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, “Martyrs: The Building Blocks of Nations,” http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_martyrs.htm, January 3, 2007, 2-3.

exist by “spreading this divine ideology and implanting it into the real world.” For Azzam, the fundamentals of the faith were found in “the ink of its scholars and the blood of its martyrs,” and it would be through their efforts that the *ummah* will be “rescued from their decline.”¹⁵²

Azzam praises the efforts of a small group of holy warriors as, “the cream of the cream of the cream,”¹⁵³ but he was using them as an example to motivate his broader audience. The Afghan mujahadeen, who had responded to a domestic call against a direct threat, had become the role model for the universal ummah. For the global ummah, “Afghanistan meant little to them, but the faith...meant a great deal.”¹⁵⁴ This framing ensured that the anti-Soviet jihad was not seen as only an Afghan resistance movement and helped avoid the perception that the mujahadeen were mere pawns of the United States.

Sheikh Azzam used religious language to formulate arguments for the Afghan Jihad. He clearly identified and charged his audience with making the ultimate sacrifice for the sake of the cause. While Azzam incorporated what may be termed fundamentalist rhetoric that reifies the boundary lines between a group and those outside of the group, he sought to remove ideological barriers between the Arab and Afghan coreligionists to rally a broader audience for a specific objective of liberating the country of Afghanistan. He included references to the Qur’an and hadith, but collective violence, not the “inerrancy”¹⁵⁵ of fundamentalism, was his goal. Azzam effectively rallied large numbers to join the anti-Soviet jihad and “form a line against the retreat of their religion,”¹⁵⁶ More importantly, however, he was able to align them with like-minded organizations that could provide both the financial and military resources needed for waging a guerilla war against a super power.

¹⁵² Azzam, 1.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 5.

¹⁵⁴ Wright, 97.

¹⁵⁵ Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, “Fundamentalisms: Genus and Species,” *Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms Around the World*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003, 105.

¹⁵⁶ Wright, 97.

E. JIHAD IN THE HANDS OF INFIDELS: ALLIANCES OF OPPORTUNITY

The universal resonance of the Afghan Jihad was evidenced by the young men from across the Muslim world who answered the call to arms and made their way to Pakistan and Afghanistan to join the struggle against the Soviets. Unwilling to send its own troops into the fray for fear of starting World War III, the United States “had to remain indirect via proxies”¹⁵⁷ in its fight against the Soviets. The Afghan Jihad made it possible for the United States to activate alliances with groups already established in Afghanistan and various Muslim groups throughout the world.

As the Afghan resistance forces took on the communist infidels, they were in fact aligning themselves with the United States and other Western nations. The United States is a distinctly non-Islamic nation, frequently referred to by extremist Islamic groups with the inflammatory moniker, Great Satan.¹⁵⁸ Although the alliance with the United States was kept somewhat secretive, the money, equipment and, more importantly, the American personnel involved in supporting the jihad gave it a dynamic that contrasts with more fundamentalist interpretations of jihad. War, however, has an interesting way of bringing people together.

While the end user may have seen himself as a holy warrior removed from the trappings of the non-Islamic world, the weapons he was using had been paid for and passed on to him through a convoluted network of partners whose ideologies were more similar to his enemies’ than his own. That the Christian/Western United States, Communist China, and an Israel-friendly Egypt took part in supporting the jihad is a political enigma. As the politics of supporting the jihad were a confounding paradox, so also did the supply of weapons and equipment to support the Afghan resistance become a logistical nightmare. Weapons shipments came through the Pakistani port of Karachi, the Wakhan Corridor with China and various other ports of entry. After arriving in Pakistan, the weapons were distributed through a network overseen by the Pakistani Inter Service

¹⁵⁷ Mark P. Lagon, “The International System and the Reagan Doctrine: Can Realism Explain Aid to ‘Freedom Fighters’?” *British Journal of Political Science*, Volume 22, No. 1. (January 1992), 52.

¹⁵⁸ Kepel, 136-137.

Intelligence (ISI),¹⁵⁹ who moved them to locations in Peshawar and Quetta before passing them on to the various groups of mujahadeen.¹⁶⁰ Mohammad Yousaf, a Pakistani Army officer involved in managing the ISI support to the mujahadeen, captures some of the paradox of the Afghan Jihad in discussing how Israel was also a source of weapons:

I had no idea that Israel was a source until quite recently, as, had it been known, there would have been considerable trouble with the Arab nations. It would not have been acceptable to wage a Jihad with weapons bought from Israel.¹⁶¹

Financial support for the Islamist parties, however, was directly routed to them through their own networks.¹⁶² By this means, the fundamentalist groups could keep themselves detached from alliances with infidels.

The need for support created somewhat of a two-way ideological dilemma for both the United States and some of the Islamist groups in that not all of them reached the same agreement on how to work with the non-Muslim *infidels* who were supporting the Afghan cause, particularly the United States:

While the fundamentalist groups command more following, the U.S. seems unwilling to develop any rapprochement with them...The fundamentalists' attitudes towards the U.S. differ. Hikmatyar is strictly against accepting any aid from the U.S., while Rabbani, Sayaf and Khalis recognize the necessity of unconditional aid.¹⁶³

As this example demonstrates, even in a fight against the superpower might of the Soviet Union, the question of support from infidels drew a dividing line amongst the fundamentalist groups. Ideological purity for the *Hezb-i Islami* apparently outweighed the practical needs of its jihad.

¹⁵⁹ Yousaf, 81, 82.

¹⁶⁰ John G. Merriam, "Arms Shipments to the Afghan Resistance," *Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987, 72.

¹⁶¹ Yousaf, 83.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Amin, 397.

The Afghan Jihad example also points to the challenge that Islamic regimes have had in waging jihad alongside non-Muslims, as demonstrated by the Saudis who found it necessary to protect their “American ally...against the wrath of Sunni activists.”¹⁶⁴ Essentially, the Saudi regime realized that they needed to placate the more fundamental Islamists by painting the Soviet Union as a greater evil than the United States. By keeping their presence to a minimum during the jihad in order to avoid direct combat with the Soviets, the Americans were inadvertently maintaining the ideological purity of the jihad. In contrast, the Soviets, with a physical presence on the ground, were viewed as the real imperialists, validating the frame that presented them as the greatest threat — a frame, ironically, they had tried to pin on the United States.

F. CONCLUSION

The Afghan jihad is a rich case study for the tenets of SMT. In reviewing the various books and articles on the subject, the events, organizations and personalities that are endemic to this time period make much more sense when applying the various concepts and theses that seek to explain why groups mobilize. The religious character of the Afghan jihad, and its effectiveness at mobilizing and sustaining the struggle over a decade of Soviet occupation, validates the importance of studying the religious and ideological components of collective action.

The event that triggered the Afghan jihad, the Soviet invasion, provided the impetus for groups who were already operating against an unpopular regime to come to the forefront. The invasion provided the change in the political opportunity structure in which these groups would be legitimized as the voice of resistance in Afghanistan. As the Soviets responded with a level of repression that has been called genocide, their presence was even more indicative of the evil that the jihad spoke against. To challenge this evil, the Afghans turned to their religious institutions and the Islamist groups, and the rebellion grew.

¹⁶⁴ Kepel, 137.

The Afghan struggle against the Soviet Union became unique as a rebellion when jihad ideology was activated. What had heretofore been a war of liberation for the Afghan population, now became a spiritual battle. As a spiritual battle, the plight of the Afghans inspired Islamic organizations across the Muslim world to come to their aid. Not only did fellow Muslims come to the aid of the mujahadeen, but several other powers, who had a mutual interest in fighting the Soviet Union, found benefit in empowering the Islamist groups to fight on their behalf. While these alliances may have been problematic under different circumstances, they became the lifeblood for the mujahadeen.

The framing of the Afghan jihad as a universal struggle incumbent upon all good Muslims to contribute to, became a stepping off point for jihad ideology and a validation of its mobilizing effectiveness. As the ideologues that had generated support for the Afghan jihad sought to consolidate their gains, they completed the frame by transferring from a narrative of the underdog to the narrative of the conquering holy warriors. In their estimation, “the jihad is seen to have assumed a global role by participating in the Cold War.”¹⁶⁵ While the Afghans’ coalitions, which had ousted the Soviets, now spiraled into an internecine fight for control of Afghanistan, the Arab mujahadeen began to return to their home countries. As the ideology was transforming, the Afghan jihad would also provide the cadres for a new form of jihad.

¹⁶⁵ Devji, 28.

IV. TAKING JIHAD OUT OF THE HANDS OF INFIDELS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter looks at how the global jihad has adopted the universal call of the Afghan jihad and has transformed within the paradigm of globalization through a process of weaponization. This process of weaponization, or “radicalization,” under the auspices of a jihad has taken place at different periods of time and under various circumstances. “Radicalization is not unique to Islam nor is it a new phenomenon.”¹⁶⁶ Therefore, unraveling this process is crucial to understanding how it came about. Within the social sciences, the school of Social Mobilization Theory (SMT) has developed several arguments pertaining to causal relationships, which are useful for analyzing the formations and trajectories of groups who want to change the status quo in their societies. As discussed in the prior chapters, Robinson’s summation of SMT can be boiled down to three main causal variables which are linked together: “changes in political opportunity structures,” “mobilizing structures,” and “cultural framing.”¹⁶⁷ Taking this framework and applying it to the *global jihad* demonstrates that globalization provides the opportunity for all three aspects of SMT theory to work in the weaponization of jihad ideology.

B. GLOBALIZATION’S EVER CHANGING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES

The study of globalization includes literature that both heralds the opportunities and warns of the impending disasters that the phenomenon might bring. The proclaimed benefits of global connectedness include greater economic opportunities, as well as the potential to create peace through greater transparency and the sharing of ideas. Some see

¹⁶⁶ A Counter Strategy, http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/reports/NETworked%20Radicalization_A%20Counter%20Strategy.pdf, accessed on May 10, 2007, 8.

¹⁶⁷ Glenn E. Robinson, “ Hamas as a Social Movement,” *Islamic Activism, A Social Movement Theory Approach*, edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004, 116.

a possibility for “the advancement of common human standards and equality”¹⁶⁸ and the breaking down of ideological and national boundaries, which will bring universal harmony to the planet.

At the same time, some of the literature also decries the fears of a world without financial barriers, where fortunes may be lost in milliseconds as the interconnectedness of markets may lead to simultaneous economic collapse. The flow of the new wealth from these markets will only benefit those who are already wealthy and create a world where the “disparity between developed and developing nations...fuels frustrated expectations...and heightened communal tensions.”¹⁶⁹ Likewise, globalization has been blamed for generating a “New Security Dilemma,”¹⁷⁰ which paints the future as a world where the international system is turned upside down, and terrorist organizations are able to establish networks capable of unleashing havoc with weapons of mass destruction or homemade explosive devices using instructions garnered from the Internet.

Each argument has its merit, but what is most apparent is that globalization provides opportunities. The obvious hypocrisy of networked global “anti-globalization protests”¹⁷¹ reveals that even those who view globalization as an evil must embrace the thing they hate in order to be effective. The difficulties of trying to identify what a completely networked world will look like are too numerous to name here. Whether these opportunities lead to increased peace and cooperation among peoples or to increased violence and instability remains to be seen. The future will undoubtedly provide cases that can support either viewpoint.

According to SMT, changes in political opportunity structures provide the opportunity for political actors, including groups that embrace violence, to insert themselves into the political realm in order to make changes to the status quo as they see

¹⁶⁸ Sean Kay, “Globalization, Power and Security,” *Security Dialogue* volume 35, no. 1, SAGE Publications, March 2004, 10.

¹⁶⁹ Christopher Rudolph, “Globalization and Security: Migration and Evolving Conceptions of Security in Statecraft and Scholarship,” *Security Studies* 13, no. 1 (Autumn 2003) London, Frank Cass, 11.

¹⁷⁰ Philip G. Cerny, “Terrorism and the New Security Dilemma,” *Naval War College Review*, 58(1), Winter 2005, 12.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 17.

fit. These changes in political opportunity structures are phenomenon associated with the state level of analysis, where opportunities for political changes are associated with interstate wars, drastic changes in the world economy, or other major pressures on the structure of a state. While the word *globalization* has become a sort of panacea for a multitude of new economic, social, political and technological trends, the phenomenon does provide for the opportunity to view these SMT variables at work.

C. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES: THE GLOBAL UMMAH

Under SMT, organizations wanting to enact change frequently capitalize on the tangible and intangible assets that other existing organizations, such as religious groups, social networks and family relationships, can provide — which may be used to help further their cause. In the edited volume, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Quintan Wiktorowicz looks at “the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes”¹⁷² in a variety of Islamic movements, providing a bridge between the study of collective action and the role of religion in providing resources to such movements. This book and others like it — which are able to look at Islam as a source for the political/ideological component of movements and not just an end in itself — help in asking better questions about the organizations and the forces that drive them.

As discussed in previous chapters, the concept of the ummah existed long before the paradigm of globalization. The Internet, however, provides the tool that allows this imagined community to be realized. During the Afghan jihad, the structures that facilitated the collective action in defense of the ummah against the Soviets included the Islamist organizations, as well as tribes that had banded together to take up arms. Whereas historic Islam had seen mobilization for jihad under state-like institutions such as armies, now sub-state actors were taking the lead in calling for jihad. Within the paradigm of globalization, the social networks that may be tapped into for resources may not be as locally obvious as they had been in Afghanistan. There is opportunity for mobilization nonetheless. In the twenty-first century, the global ummah becomes the

¹⁷² Quintan Wiktorowicz, editor, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004, 10.

target audience for activation. This is the continuation of a process that began during the Afghan jihad when Arabs were called from around the world to defend their fellow Muslims.

This new global ummah has developed in cyberspace. Some of its members have latched onto and continued the propagation of the virulent strain of jihad that had been revived during the Afghan jihad.

A small, exclusive group of Arabic-language Web sites now forms the core of this virtual community. These forums serve as the point of interaction for active members and passive supporters worldwide. A crucial sense of community is fostered within these spaces, with members signing on daily to discuss the ongoing trials and tribulations of the international Jihad, develop consensus on current events, engage in theological debates, and even plan hypothetical attacks. This presence, dubbed "the Electronic Jihad" by its members, is fast coalescing into a virtual community of believers, steadily growing in strength, influence, and technological sophistication, and now proving as indispensable to the global jihadi movement as are guns and bombs.¹⁷³

Attempting to classify this "small, exclusive group" in SMT terminology is difficult. SMT looks at localized "repressive political environments,"¹⁷⁴ but it is a phenomenon that needs to continue being grappled with in the field of study nonetheless. This is especially true as the global ideology is adapted to fit local struggles or local actions are touted as a component of the global jihad.

1. Small Group Jihad

In the current iteration of the jihad, "the ubiquity of the Internet means that small terrorist groups can have a global cyber presence that rivals that of much larger organizations."¹⁷⁵ Of course the ability to reach this audience is dependent upon that audience's ability to access the Internet. Another challenge is the literacy rate among

¹⁷³ International Relations and Security Network, "Mapping the electronic jihad," <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17535>, accessed on May 5, 2007.

¹⁷⁴ Hafez, 22.

¹⁷⁵ Irving Lachow and Courtney Richardson, "Terrorist Use of the Internet, The Real Story." Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 45, 2d quarter 2007. http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i45/24.pdf, accessed April 20, 2007, 100.

potential actors. Within the paradigm of globalization, however, these challenges are reduced exponentially as technology becomes more available, spreading ever farther into the remote regions of the world. The number of Internet-savvy individuals is also increasing, and live video feeds of the global jihad in action make literacy a non-requirement. The resulting effect on Islam is that:

The more traditional forms of Muslim authority are broken down within the jihad; therefore, the more like other global movements such as environmentalism or the anti-globalization protests does Islam become.¹⁷⁶

While this global ummah lacks the local religious infrastructures, which are an essential component of social mobilization, the availability of the ideology provides inspiration and an ideological foundation for any would-be participants to join — either as part of a small group or as an individual. While the ideology may be available globally, it does not become a spark leading to weaponization unless it finds an audience where its message resonates.

Various sites on the Internet provide ideological and technical guidance to potential warriors who claim to fight under the banner of jihad. For instance, the proliferation of information on the manufacture and use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) as well as chemical and biological weapons via the Internet has allowed these self-proclaimed global jihadis to take full advantage of the lessons learned by their imagined comrades in arms on the battlefields of Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. A recent survey of a number of these jihad Web sites indicates that the majority of visits to these Web sites come from the Middle East (78 percent).¹⁷⁷ Although the global jihad has a universal following, as this study indicates, the majority of interest in its tenets still resides in the geographical regions of the historic jihad.

The effectiveness of small group jihad in producing, hinges on the competence of that group in planning, organizing, and equipping for their attacks. As the Christian Patriots, Tim McVeigh and Terry Nichols, demonstrated in Oklahoma City in 1995, it

¹⁷⁶ Devji, 31.

¹⁷⁷ Mapping the electronic jihad <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17535>, accessed on May 5, 2007.

does not take an army or a massive military industrial complex to have the capacity to kill a lot of people.¹⁷⁸ The “second-deadliest terrorist attack in modern history,”¹⁷⁹ the 1978 Cinema Rex fire that was started by a small group of revolutionary Shiites in Abadan, Iran, killed 377 people. The power of small group jihad has numerous historic examples to draw from — both internal and external to the practice of global jihad ideology.

2. Individual Jihad

At its purist level, the jihad is supposed to be a deeply personal, individual struggle. This thread has been woven throughout the history of jihad. When the jihad has been militarized, the battles were still in the hands of individuals, whether they were part of an army, militia or a small group. Within the ideology of the global jihad, the individual is also pressed to contribute, whether as part of a group or to take on solo missions as a physical representation of this struggle. In today’s globalized world, “the transformation of geo-politics into metaphysics is what makes the practices of holy war ethical,”¹⁸⁰ personalizing the struggle as a religious quest. The ethical nature of jihad ideology is an important if not sufficient component for understanding an individual’s decision to partake in the jihad. While today’s individual mujahadeen may not be shoulder to shoulder or sharing a foxhole with his mujahadeen brothers, as in the jihads of the past, his actions are nonetheless framed as part of a larger struggle by the collective ummah against the collective non-ummah.

Individual jihad has historic precedence in foundational cases where jihad has been waged for various reasons. Jihad ideologues, such as Muhammad Hakaymah make sure these cases are framed to show their import in changing the course of history. Hakaymah keys in on specific individuals such as Sulayman al-Halabi who assassinated Kleber, the commander of Napoleon’s expedition in Egypt, heralding it as one of the

¹⁷⁸ CNN Online. “The bombing.” <http://www.cnn.com/US/OKC/bombing.html>, accessed on May 10, 2007.

¹⁷⁹ Daniel L. Byman, *The Rise of Low-Tech Terrorism*, May 6, 2007; www.washingtonpost.com, 1. last accessed....

¹⁸⁰ Faisal Devji, *Landscapes of the Jihad*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005, 126.

events which hastened the French “departure from Egypt,”¹⁸¹ and therefore a victory for the jihad. Similar individual actions are framed as being the continuation of a tradition that has “recurred throughout Islamic history” as the tool of resistance when the ummah has been under attack.

An individual need not wait to become a member of a cell, but can contribute as another of “dozens of individual operations”¹⁸² that have taken place throughout the world. Hakaymah provides several individual actions from throughout the Middle East, which he attributes to the global jihad as examples to follow. He praises Salman Khatir who “opened fire on his own decision on a number of Jews on the Egyptian-Israeli border,” or “an old Moroccan (who) stabbed a dozen French tourists in Morocco.” His list is diverse in both scope and technique, praising individual stabbings and shootings of Americans, Europeans, Russians, Jews and collaborators as contributions to the jihad. He even describes how “in the Emirates, the body of an Italian was discovered,” without mentioning a perpetrator or motivation, is a demonstration of the power of jihad.

None of these actions appears to have been controlled by any single group, but were simply lumped together in Hakaymah’s list to frame his argument for the merits of individual jihad. By attributing these actions as part of a global jihad carried out by individuals, he is attempting to build a sense of unity within the ummah. That these actions may arguably be tied to local struggles and may in some instances perhaps be the actions of the criminally insane is apparently irrelevant for Hakaymah’s argument that they are somehow all part of a massive movement. He is placing these individuals alongside the heroes of jihads past as a challenge for the global ummah to not sit idle, and to join the ranks of a movement that hinges upon their participation.

¹⁸¹ Muhammad Khalil al-Hakaymah, “Toward a New Strategy in Resisting the Occupier (Goals and Means),” <http://ctc.usma.edu/secure/Hakaymah/Hakaymah--TowardNewStrategy--UNCLASS.pdf>, accessed January 30, 2007, 4.

¹⁸² Ibid., 4.

D. GLOBAL JIHAD: THE FRAME THAT SELLS ITSELF

Global Islamic violence today is most clearly associated with Al Qaeda and its charismatic leader, Osama bin Laden. While lacking formal religious training, he wields a charisma that has made him into a global icon. His pictures are prominently displayed in the homes of those who espouse his ideology. Seemingly out of deference to Al Qaeda's popularity, even terrorist groups, such as the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)¹⁸³ changing its name to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, North Africa, to identify themselves as participants in the global jihad franchise.¹⁸⁴ In another example of his global image, he served as a kind of virtual running mate for an Islamic candidate in the Philippines in 2007.¹⁸⁵ A search for the name "Bin Laden"¹⁸⁶ on Google yielded over one million hits, whereas the word "jihad"¹⁸⁷ had only 135,000 hits. As this small search hints at, bin Laden has, in many ways, become the frame of reference for the global jihad, perhaps outshining the concept of jihad itself with his notoriety.

Osama bin Laden's message of global jihad evolved out of the Afghan jihad. During that time, bin Laden had seen the effect of Azzam's call to jihad and Azzam "provided a model for the man he would become."¹⁸⁸ As a veteran of the jihad in Afghanistan, bin Laden developed credentials that lent themselves to the creation of a cult of personality of people willing to follow him. During the Afghan jihad, Osama participated, somewhat, with the established religious system of Saudi Arabia, but now works outside of that system. His message that "whoever is guided by God cannot be

¹⁸³ The actual acronym in French is the Groupe Islamiste pour la Predication et le Combat.

¹⁸⁴ Bruce Riedel, "Al Qaeda Strikes Back," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2007.

¹⁸⁵ Sky News, "He is the Other Osama." <http://news.sky.com/skynews/article/0,,30200-1261289,00.html>, accessed May 23, 2007.

¹⁸⁶ Google, <http://www.google.com/hws/search?client=dell&adsafe=high&safe=high&channel=us-psp&hl=en&ibd=&q=bin+laden&Submit=Search>, accessed on April 19, 2007.

¹⁸⁷ Google, <http://www.google.com/hws/search?client=dell&adsafe=high&safe=high&channel=us-psp&hl=en&ibd=&q=jihad>, accessed on April 19, 2007.

¹⁸⁸ Wright, 96.

misled” resonates with those who accept his criticism of state-sponsored Islam for enabling the “unjust crusade campaign of the United States.”¹⁸⁹

1. Jihad with the Infidels: An Unacceptable Frame

The presence of U.S. and other coalition forces on Saudi soil preparing for combat against the Iraqi army during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 created a problem for Osama, and an affront to what he saw as pure Islam. Freshly returning from the mujahadeen victory over the atheistic superpower might of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, he offered to take up jihad against the Iraqis. He arguably must have seen the threat of Saddam Hussein as a small challenge for those fighting the jihad. Having seen the victory that Allah had given the faithful against one superpower, he mocked the idea of allying with the infidels as some sort of crutch. The necessity of relying on the United States to protect it from Saddam proved, in Osama’s mind, the weakness and corrupt nature of the Saudi regime.

During the Gulf War in 1991, bin Laden condemned the Saudi regime for “the opening of the land of the two holy mosques to the American occupiers” and imprisoning “the true *ulema*,”¹⁹⁰ thereby threatening the purity of Islam in his mind. Blame for the decision to allow “the Gulf regimes to depend on the infidels in attacking Saddam Hussein”¹⁹¹ was laid at the feet of Sheik bin Baz, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia who had issued a *fatwa*, or religious ruling, to allow the Americans to enter the kingdom. Osama framed the relationship as one in which the Saudis, “enlarged the role of bin Baz because of...his weakness and flexibility,”¹⁹² thereby giving him greater authority to legitimize their decisions. From Osama’s perspective, this was proof that imposter *ulema*, headed by bin Baz, were legitimizing the Saudi regime in a mutually supportive

¹⁸⁹ Osama Bin Laden, “Bin Laden Declares Jihad on Americans,” Translation, *London Al-Islah*, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) database, 1. date??

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 2.

¹⁹¹ U.S. Military Academy Combating Terrorism Center, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/AFGP-2002-602187-Trans.pdf>, accessed on April 26, 2007, 2.

¹⁹² Lawrence, 35.

incestuous religious political alliance, and their authority was therefore invalid. He framed himself as incorruptible and unable to be shaken by earthly rulers — in contrast to bin Baz’s apparent lack of integrity.

With corrupt political and religious leadership in charge of the Holy Land, Bin Laden charged that they no longer needed to be obeyed. Five years later, he would issue his Declaration of Jihad, hearkening back to a hadith to “expel the Polytheists from the Arabian peninsula”¹⁹³ since this was the source of “the greatest disaster to befall the Muslims since the death of the Prophet Muhammad.”¹⁹⁴ Framing his jihad as an ideologically pure variant, free from the influence of an infidel alliance, would be an essential component of legitimizing bin Laden’s campaign against the House of Saud and America.

2. Internet Framing: The Medium Validates the Message.

The effectiveness of a message not only consists of its ideological content, but also “the textual medium through which ideological pronouncements are reproduced and communicated fundamentally affects the way the pronouncements are received and understood.”¹⁹⁵ For instance, during the Reformation, the printing press had an integral role in spreading the message of change being demanded of the religious-political establishment. Not only did the printing press enable the distribution of numerous Bibles in common European languages, but it made physically possible one of the key revolutionary principles put forth during the Reformation: the Bible was intended to be made available and understandable by people at any strata of society, and not just the professional religious elite.

Like the printing press to the Reformation or pamphlets distributed by the *Hezb-i Islami* to the Islamist movements prior to the Afghan jihad, the Internet enables the physical manifestation of the ideological tenets of an individual’s jihad, that of personal

¹⁹³ “From the *hadith* collection of al-Bukhari, no. 2,932; also found in the collection of Murdin, no. 3,089,” Lawrence, 24.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 24-25.

¹⁹⁵ David B. Edwards, 610.

purity and detachment from corruption. Not only can the searcher find an imagined community to be a part of and a cause to believe in, but now he can also experience an imagined personal purity as he participates in individual jihad. The ideologues who promote this type of jihad:

Currently have firm possession of that battlefield because they understand this shift and have crafted and disseminated a narrative that resonates and that has served both to energize and expand their ranks.¹⁹⁶

Cyberspace is a new type of terrain on which the warped ideological visions of extremist groups can be expounded or moved about to new cyber locations virtually unchecked.

3. Keeping the Jihad Pure: Technological Monasticism

While the Internet provides many resources for terrorist groups, some potential problems may also come through the medium of cyberspace:

Reliance on the Internet also creates the opportunity for outsiders to pose as insiders in order to provide misinformation or simply to create doubt among the terrorists about who they can trust.¹⁹⁷

This highlights the practical security need to protect the global jihad from infiltration and exploitation by security forces. Not only are external cyber threats challenging the jihad, but internal distractions can distort the frame and derail the weaponization process as well.

While there are practical reasons for blocking out cyber intruders, there is also a need to shelter those recruits in the embryonic stages of “radicalization” from ideologically wavering. With the need to protect their recruits from outside influences, al Qaeda must act in ways similar to that of parents protecting their children from pornography and other corrupting influences on the Internet:

¹⁹⁶ The Georgetown University Policy Institute, http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/reports/NETworked%20Radicalization_A%20Counter%20Strategy.pdf, accessed on May 5, 2007.

¹⁹⁷ Lachow and Richardson, 101.

One of al Qaeda's goals is to use the Internet to create 'resistance blockades' in order to prevent Western ideas from "further corrupting Islamic institutions, organizations, and ideas." One technique they use is to distribute Internet browsers that have been designed to filter out content from undesirable sources (for example, Western media) without the users' knowledge.¹⁹⁸

The idea of the Western media playing the role of Tokyo Rose to the global jihad is not taken lightly by its sponsors. They know they are drawing on a pool of potential recruits who could choose from a plethora of competing ideological masters. This is an ongoing challenge for the jihad's entrepreneurs since "once someone has become an insider...continuous interactions are required to maintain the needed level of commitment."¹⁹⁹ Although the process is difficult, maintaining the framing purity of jihad ideology is crucial for maintaining its relevance and mobilizing capacity for the global ummah.

E. CONCLUSION

During the Afghan jihad, and while he was a guest of the Taliban, bin Laden was tied into organizations that could support his war against America. Now, however, his organization, while still dangerously capable of striking out, is showing signs of what some experts would describe as desperation and perhaps the end of a cycle of violence. While the Afghan jihad was ultimately successful in galvanizing an army of mujahadeen, as well as developing partnerships that supported it through the successful expulsion of the Soviets, Al Qaeda still struggles to remove the United States and its "corrupt" partner regimes in the Middle East.

¹⁹⁸ Lachow and Richardson, 101.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 101.

V. CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter summarizes the transformation of jihad ideology as both a mobilizing tool used by Islamic nation states as well as the basis for a narrative of dissent for groups looking to overthrow the established system. Throughout the history of jihad, the skillful manipulation of the language of jihad as a mobilizing tool by non-Islamic nations has effectively rallied Islamic allies. This apparent compromise, however, has frustrated those groups who hold a more extreme version of Islam and see such alliances as heretical. The global jihad, however, maintains its ideological “purity” and avoids such entanglements by utilizing the new tools of globalization, specifically the Internet. Globalization has enabled these groups to acquire the tools for waging jihad without having to form ideologically problematic alliances with those they view as infidels.

B. ENTANGLING INFIDEL ALLIANCES

Alliances can be useful when uniting against a common foe, but there are inherent difficulties, hence George Washington’s warning to a young United States against forming “entangling alliances” with European nations. Similarly, Islamic leaders seeking the military strength of an alliance with an infidel European or Western power have had to wrestle with the issue of compromising their sovereignty — and perhaps delegitimizing their religious authority.

Like all wars, wars under the banner of jihad not only need warriors, but also require information and resources, since, as Napoleon said, an army marches on its belly. Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire with the abolition of the caliphate, the warriors of jihad have not always been able to support their struggle with their own resources, but have had to draw support from elsewhere. To reconcile this problem, Islamic regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, have sought the approval of the religious community to validate their decisions to partner with non-Islamic allies.

As the jihad ideology has been a component of many historical conflicts, an obvious divergence between the pragmatic jihad of Islamic political regimes and the avowedly unadulterated hybrid places adherence to ideology above loyalty to an earthly ruler, even if he is a Muslim. These principles came into being early in the history of the Islam. They were first adopted by the Kharajites as justification for breaking away from the main group of Muslims and eventually assassinating the fourth caliph, Ali. This form of ideology has run parallel to the history of traditional state-sanctioned jihad and has seen its own transformation. In its most recent iteration, it has been adopted by non-state actors such as Al Qaeda.

The unlikely partnership of Afghan and Arab mujahadeen with the United States, other Western countries, and even Communist China against the Soviet Union demonstrates the pragmatic flexibility of jihad ideology in creating partnerships to face down foes. However, as demonstrated in the case of the Afghan jihad, the more virulent and pure strain of jihad ideology needed to be kept from the hands of infidels, as demonstrated by Hekmatyar's *Hezb-i Islami* party and its decision to not take support from the United States. This particular strain of the jihad has an apparently uncompromising view of infidel alliances that exceeds even the practical needs of fighting a war against a super power.

In 1991, the Saudis received this blessing in the form of a *fatwa*, or juridical ruling from the religious community, allowing U.S. forces to come to their aid during the Gulf War,²⁰⁰ essentially waging jihad with the infidel. Even with the blessing of the religious community, this alliance with an infidel power still discredited them in the eyes of those who claimed to represent pure, unadulterated Islam for having become puppets to a foreign power. This was evidenced by Osama bin Laden's virulent criticism of the Saudi decision to enlist the aid of the United States in warding off Saddam Hussein. The purity of the jihad ideology of the Saudi regime had been tainted; an untarnished variant was needed to counter this affront to their interpretation of Islam. To frame this "new" jihad, the ideologues would tap into the variant of jihad that had begun with the

²⁰⁰ Ibrahim A. Karawan, "Monarchs, Mullas, and Marshals: Islamic Regimes?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 524 (November 1992) 103-119: 109.

Kharajites and whose framers, including Wahhab, Qutb, Azzam and bin Laden have held sacrosanct to the point of death throughout its legacy.

C. DE-WEAPONIZING JIHAD IDEOLOGY

Jihad ideology is actually a series of ideologies that have manifested themselves throughout history. While the jihad of physical warfare has at times been the state-centric mobilizing frame used to justify Clausewitzian politics by other means for Islamic regimes, there has also been a virulent, more idealistic form that has run parallel to the jihad of Islamic political authority. This form of jihad has existed from the beginning of Islam and has been woven throughout its history. Occasionally, this strain of the ideology would operate in concert with Islamic regimes while, at other times, it would clash. This is the jihad of the self-righteous underdog who seeks purity over pragmatism. It stresses a violent, uncompromising variant of the ideology in order to attract like-minded individuals to kill and be killed as a measure of devotion “that is more ethical than political in nature.”²⁰¹ Its storied history provides a wealth of myths that various entrepreneurs have been able to invoke to frame jihad in their particular situation. As the legacy of jihad is explored, the assumptions that Islam is the sole activator of violent action dissipate and reveal a greater complexity in understanding the phenomenon of jihad. Delving into the history of jihad brings to light various other causative factors, including political, social and economic forces that were at work when Islamic nations decided to go to war.

The difference, between the recognizably legitimate authority for declaring jihad vested in caliphs as leaders of Islamic nation states and the presumptuously assumed authority of individuals such as Osama bin Laden, demonstrates the versatility of jihad rhetoric. Similarly, the legitimacy of the mujahadeen struggle against the Soviet Union stands in stark contrast to that of terrorists who claim to bear the mantle of global jihad against the West and its allies today. Analyzing this transformation in the ideology of jihad demonstrates a desire to maintain legitimacy and purity in the minds of extremists claiming to fight in the name of jihad. Indeed the “bastard phenomena” of the global

²⁰¹ Devji, 34.

jihad “depend(s) upon the erosion of traditional religious and political allegiances for its very existence.”²⁰² While pragmatism may lead some groups to ideological compromise to build alliances or garner support, it is less than ideal, especially for those who must maintain an image of infallibility in order to maintain the “integrity” of their version of jihad.

The weaponization of jihad ideology, in comparison with uranium or anthrax weaponization, leads to an interesting parallel in the U.S. defense establishment. In March 2007, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s (DTRA) took part in a Future Strategic Contexts for WMD-related Planning and Operations workshop. This workshop was a combined effort between the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), DTRA and the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) to “devise a strategy to counter the arguments of the radical Islamists and to undermine their appeal to susceptible Muslim audiences around the world.”²⁰³ This workshop considered various academic approaches to get a better understanding of the phenomenon of the radicalization process and consider methods of countering its effectiveness.

In the late 1990s, DTRA was given oversight of the Senator Nunn, Senator Lugar (now Senator Obama, Senator Lugar) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The various missions of CTR include “strategic offensive arms elimination; nuclear warhead dismantlement; nuclear weapons storage security; chemical weapons destruction; biological weapons proliferation prevention; reactor core conversions; nuclear material protection, control and accounting; export control initiatives; defense conversion.”²⁰⁴ The CTR program essentially pays contractors to reduce the stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and the military/industrial facilities used to build those weapons within the former Soviet Union. With DTRA now participating in discussions regarding the ideology of terrorist organizations, the United States is recognizing the

²⁰² Devji, 25.

²⁰³ Jacquelyn K. Davis and Charles M. Perry, Principal Investigators, *Rethinking the War on Terror: Developing a Strategy to Counter Extremist Ideologies*, A Workshop Report, HDTRA1-06-F-0054, March 2007. http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Rethink_WOT.pdf, accessed April 19, 2007.

²⁰⁴ The Nuclear Threat Initiative, “The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program,” http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/nunn_lug/overview.htm, accessed April 19, 2007.

need to look at the sources and processes of radicalization as a means of deterring future threats. While the radicalization of jihad ideology is obviously a social phenomenon, as opposed to the scientific process of enriching uranium or plutonium, the comparison with the weaponization of biologic and nuclear materials is quite apt.

D. RECOMMENDATION: RAISING THE COSTS OF JIHAD

The jihad may be an ideological holy war, but it still takes resources to be operationalized in order produce and sustain violent acts. While there are numerous other factors, ranging from vengeance to money, that incite individuals to join these self-proclaimed jihadi groups, the jihad banner is perhaps the most effective umbrella cause under which to rally these individuals. Ideology is an important, yet intangible resource in the weaponization of jihad. Throughout the transformation of jihad ideology, maintaining the purity of the cause has been an important task for those who hold an extreme vision of how the world should be. While individuals such as the 9/11 hijackers may engage in impure acts as part of their disguise, or because they believe that their pending martyr status will absolve them, ideological integrity remains essential during the radicalization process.

The ideology of the jihad of dissent has existed for centuries, manifesting violently in some instances. As the Kharajites became disgusted with Ali following the battle of Siffeen, and the Hezb-i Islami refused to accept support from America during the Afghan jihad, so also do the advocates of global jihad insist on maintaining the ideological purity of their cause. Although these groups refuse infidel alliances, they nonetheless need resources to wage their struggle. In the Afghan case, Hezb-i Islami was able to receive support from like-minded organizations in Arab countries. Support now flows to various jihad organizations through a mix of organizations sympathetic to their cause, allowing them to survive.

To maintain the purity of jihad on the Internet, the ideologues must proactively block out or provide convincing counter arguments to keep those who are undergoing radicalization from going astray. The Internet, while it does provide some anonymity, is also penetrable by security forces. It is also the playground of ideas that compete for the

attention of potential actors. Ideologies, such as those found in the global jihad, can never be truly eradicated, but they can be discredited or marginalized. In an interview with the Al Jazeera network news organization, bin Laden himself recognizes that U.S. strategy includes an effort to “place psychological pressure on the *mujahidin* and their supporters, so that they would forsake the obligation of *jihad*,”²⁰⁵ by de-legitimizing the ideologues of the global jihad. Clouding the purity of jihad ideology through “psychological pressure” is a unique approach, and since it has been identified as a threat by bin Laden himself, it is an axis of attack that should continue to be exploited.

Focusing on those who promote and seek to operationalize the ideology will expose the tangible components of the jihad and reveal its vulnerabilities. Continual pressure, in the form of infiltration or cooptation of these sites, forces those who promote violent jihad ideologies to increase their cyber security measures, essentially raising the cost in terms of time if not money. While these groups have evidenced a tremendous capacity for organizational learning and have significant resources, their resources are not endless. A successful counter ideological strategy needs to involve consistently-applied pressure through the medium of the Internet, which will raise the stakes of the game and alter the radicalization process.

²⁰⁵ Lawrence, 39.

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